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Chapter 1: Introduction
Description of the Study
In this study, I examine the chronological development of a “common”
European immigration policy and evolution of the Spanish immigration laws and
the regularization programs with respect to illegal immigration and external
border controls. By referring to a “common” policy, I point to an envisioned goal
of creating a unified immigration policy, which has not yet culminated with final
process of the supranationalization1 of national policies. Thus, (the development
of) a “common” immigration policy is synonymous with a pathway to the
prospective, but still questionable, communitarization of national immigration
laws.
After the chronological evolution of policies/laws at both the EU and
national levels, I analyze the initiation of the harmonization in the mid-1980s
within the lines of neofunctionalism and, from there on, the ongoing process of
the communitarization of migration policies within the lines of supranationalism.
Furthermore, I apply (liberal)2 intergovernmentalism to the case study of Spain. I
finally scrutinize how each of the analytical frameworks has played out in two-tier
processes: 1) gradual empowerment of the EU institutions through official
treaties, summits and programs; and 2) role of a member state in the
communitarization of immigration policies.

1

In this context, supranationalization refers to an ultimate integration of policies, which then fall
under day-to-day processes of policymaking at the EU level.
2
I leave the word “liberal” in parenthesis because I reference both intergovernmentalism and its
offshoot, liberal intergovernmentalism.
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Background
Negotiations for European integration3 began almost immediately after
World War II and resulted in the Treaty of Paris of 1951, which established the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The main objectives of this
historical document embodied the incremental, special-purpose economic
integration of the signatory countries.4 Many politicians envisioned the ECSC and
the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1958 as building blocks of a fullfledged economic cooperation. Subsequently, the European Community5 began to
experience gradual socio-political integration, which over time has been
legitimizing this phenomenal and historic European project. The Treaty of
European Union of 1993 (TEU) represented a new stage of integration by opening
a way to political unity. Initially, the member states had not anticipated
integration of policy areas such as gender equality or environmental protection.
Likewise, the highly contested topic of immigration has been the source of
resentment and skepticism among national governments since an early attempt to
“communitarize” migration policies in the 1980s. Completion of the ongoing
initiative would empower the EU central institutions with decision-making and
policymaking initiatives in a policy area that has long been regarded as too
closely linked to the issue of sovereignty, hence too difficult to “communitarize.”
The ongoing European debate on unification of national immigration
policies has now a very long history. The harmonization of the migratory regime
3

European integration refers to a transfer of policymaking power from the national to the
supranational level.
4
The signatory countries were France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Italy.
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for EU citizens and legal residents commenced in the 1980s with the Schengen
Agreements of 1985 and the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. Ever since, the
process of the development of a “common” immigration policy has faced
stagnation; some of the many member states have treated immigration issues as an
essential part of their national sovereignty. Regardless of the observable
stagnation, the “common” immigration policy rhetoric found outlets for gradual
evolution. The nation states have progressively pooled and delegated their
decision making to the EU institutions: the European Commission, the European
Parliament, and the European Court of Justice. We may assert that the recent
Treaty of Lisbon also strengthened the fervent debate on the envisioned
communitarization of immigration policies.
A debate on a unified policy has been divided into several theoretical
camps, including institutionalism and state-centrism. On the one hand,
institutionalist theorists have emphasized the role of supranational institutions, the
European Commission and the European Court of Justice, in directing the
communitarization of national immigration policies. On the other hand, statecentric theorists have accredited the role of national governments in deciding on
the degree of pooling domestic policies, based on their national interests,
preferences and expectations. At a first glimpse, the process of the development
of a potential “common” immigration policy seems to align with institutionalist
theories due to evident, gradual empowering of the EU institutions over time.
However, many would argue that the member states have continued to be the
driving force behind deepening integration, awarding the EU institutions with

3

control only minimally and seeing them as mere facilitators in state and inter-state
decision-making processes.
Importance of the Study
Generally, scholars of European integration argue that Germany, France
and the United Kingdom have steered economic, political and social development
of the European Union. Similar assumptions hold with regards to formation of a
unified migration policy. However, countries of the South have in fact
significantly contributed to the process of shaping the EU migration rhetoric,
mainly due to their geographical proximity to North Africa and the Middle East.
As I argue in this study, Spain is, in fact, a leader in the debate on the process of
the development of a “common” immigration policy, especially in the realm of
illegal immigration and external border control. Such an observation shows that
not only Berlin, Paris and London dictate the nature of the harmonization of casesensitive policies. Spain‟s socio-economic upheavals, large influx of immigrants,
and geopolitical proximity to North Africa have accredited Spain as an important
player in the decision-making process. Thus, Spain‟s active advocacy for the
communitarization of immigration policies has followed an intergovernmental
pattern, emphasizing importance of this nation state‟s preferences. Significance of
domestic interests has been noticeable in the Spanish regularization programs,
which have run counter to EU restrictive objectives.
Structure of the Study
The paper comprises six chapters which are divided in smaller
subchapters. Following this introductory chapter, chapter two is a brief literature
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review, where I introduce key scholars of: neofunctionalism, supranationalism,
and (liberal) intergovernmentalism; the timing of European cooperation and the
process of harmonization in the area of immigration policy; the EU‟s influence on
Spanish policymaking; and Spain‟s impact on EU objectives. I also introduce my
own theoretical position and contribution to these field studies. Subsequently,
chapters three and four constitute chronological approaches to the “common”
immigration policy development and the national immigration laws respectively.
In the former section, I focus on the European Community/Union6 treaties,
immigration policy-oriented summits, programs and other EU developments. In
the latter chapter, I look at the Spanish immigration laws and the regularization
programs, in addition to several national programs. I also outline possible
rationales behind Spain‟s advocacy for a harmonized policy and its selective
transposition of EU objectives.
Chapter five comprises applicability of theoretical frameworks. I examine
neofunctionalist argumentation to the initiation of the harmonization process in
the 1980s and relevance of supranationalism in the study of the “common”
immigration policy development. I also incorporate an intergovernmentalist
challenge to the discussed institutionalist theories. Furthermore, I look at liberal
intergovernmentalism and its pertinence to Spain‟s role in the communitarization
of immigration policies. Lastly, I scrutinize all theories and, based on my
research, either negate or (partially) accept each of the theoretical frameworks.
6

In my work, I will use the term European Community (EC), instead of the European Union (EU)
when referencing to the EU before 1993. After that year, I will utilize the term European Union
due to the name change during the Treaty of the European Union (1993). At times, I will also use
the two abbreviations at once, i.e. EU/EC when seen as necessary.
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Finally, chapter six outlines analytical conclusions and adds any relevant remarks
to the study.
Scope of the Study
Due to the magnitude of the research topic, I introduce several parameters
to it. For the purposes of the paper, my definition of immigration policies
comprises illegal immigration, which is only one of the four politically defined
categories of migration. Additionally, I take into consideration external border
controls and legalization programs for illegal immigrants at a national level. I
intend to study: the process of empowering of the EU institutions (through
qualified majority voting in the European Council of Ministers and co-decision in
the European Parliament) by the member states via the treaties, and the evolving
nature of a “common” policy (restrictive or expansive). Thus, I mainly
concentrate on the treaties, topic-specific summits, time-specific immigration
programs, pacts and other migration- and external border-related establishments,
which involve cooperation of the EU heads of government and state. I do not
focus on directives, regulations, and recommendations in the chapter on the
process of the “common” immigration policy development. Nonetheless, the
chapter on the Spanish immigration law and the regularization programs
incorporates such law-binding legislations7 in order to trace the EU‟s impact on
the country‟s national policies.
It is crucial to mention that I do not cover the process of Europeanization,
which is a second wave of scholarship after the European integration.

7

Existing directives and regulations on immigration are a first step on a pathway to any unified
policy.

6

Europeanization mainly defines a top-down process of a member state‟s
adaptation to EU objectives. As referenced, the chapter on the evolution of the
Spanish immigration law briefly refers to EU‟s influence on Spanish legislations.
However, I do not need to apply a whole new theoretical approach to this
relatively short section of the paper in order to define the role that the EU has
played since the mid-1980s. My study focuses more on the bottom-up process
between Spain and the EU institutions.
Moreover, I introduce a modified version of liberal intergovernmentalism
as an analytical tool. Unlike Andrew Moravcsik, a prominent
intergovernmentalist scholar, I place emphasis on the electorate, whose influence
is omitted in the process of international negotiations. As I introduce my
hypothesis below, I am fully aware of the theory‟s limitations.
Another delimitation of my work is a focus on a single case study. Some
may argue that research conclusions should not be based on sole examination of
legal developments in one nation state. However, I intend to reach a conclusion
about the Spanish immigration law development and to see what light it sheds on
the intrgovernmentalist-supranationalist dichotomy, rather than to make claims
that may be applicable across the 27 member states. I argue that liberal
intergovernmentalism has, in fact, been one of the most important contributors to
the study of European integration and students of the development of a “common”
immigration policy have marked this theory as viable.8

8

For example see Finn Laursen, “Theory and Practice of Regional Integration,” Miami-Florida
European Union Center of Excellence: Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 8, no. 3
(February 2008), http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/LaursenLongSympos08RegIntegedi.pdf
(accessed September 30, 2009).
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Theoretical Foundations
The examination of the Spanish immigration law and the regularization
programs sheds light on socio-economic and political factors that have led to the
amendment of immigration policies. It also unravels the Spanish government‟s
relationship to a potential, evolving “common” immigration policy. Introduction
of a case study allows us to get a deeper and fuller understanding of the
harmonization of immigration policies and a role played by a particular member
state in its process.
I use numerous data sources in this work. Due to the topic of my study,
qualitative rather than quantitative data are more commonly presented. However,
the latter is introduced when referring to particular official statistics related to a
number of immigrants, for instance, who enter Spain and who are granted
amnesties. My qualitative data collection has focused on: firstly, primary
documents of the EU institutions in form of treaties, summits, time-framed
programs, EU directives, and certain Commission communications; secondly,
secondary sources such as relevant literature, books, doctorate and master‟s
theses, scholarly journals and articles, both in print and online.
My Anticipated Contribution
I intend to show that Spain has undoubtedly been a leader in the process of
the “common” immigration policy development. Its active advocacy, which began
in the 1990s, has placed Spain as one of few major voices in the non-monolithic
process of shaping a “common” migration policy. By using the EU as an effective
arena to resolve domestic issues, the Spanish governments (socialist and

8

conservative) have been able to project their ideas and concepts, especially in the
realm of security concerns with illegal immigration, to the EU level. The
country‟s geostrategic location has allowed it to edge out as a powerful state,
which sits behind drafting of a unified policy among other decision-making
countries, such as Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Such an
observation leads to an argument that Spain‟s lobbying power exerts decisive
influence on the policymaking process. Hence my coined term,
“intergovernmentalist supranationalization,” I argue that intergovernmentalism
has been the means of reaching the envisioned supranationalist end, thus showing
that nation states have continued to play a major role in defining a common
approach to certain policies at the EU level.
Hypothesis
In the process of developing a “common” immigration policy, countries
have gradually pooled and delegated decision-making process over illegal
immigration and border controls. A case study of Spain supports (liberal)
intergovernmentalism as a process of achieving a supranational migration regime
and thus reflecting “intergovernmentalist supranationalization.” Spain‟s wellpronounced political and socio-economic interests that relate to immigration
ultimately shape EU objectives. The EU member state has been one of the
leaders, rather than laggards, in the process of drafting a “common” immigration
policy, by using the EU as an effective tool to solve its domestic issues.

9

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Theoretical Framework
Neofunctionalism
Theoretical assumptions by prominent scholars of early neofunctionalism,
Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg, are of particular relevance to the study of regional
integration. In the late 1950s, Haas describes Western Europe as a “living
laboratory” for the study of collective action between European states.9 He
foresees that the European project would culminate as an economic and political
community through the process of European integration. Haas defines political
integration as
the process whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and
political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess
or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The
end result of process of political integration is a new political
community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones.10
Lindberg builds on Haas‟ theory. He observes the process of integration with a
particular caution. According to him, political integration is

9

Laura Cram, “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process,” in European
Union: Power and Policy-making, ed. Jeremy Richardson (London: Routledge, 2001), 55.
10
Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957 (London:
Stevens, 1958), 16.
For more on neofunctionalist approach to European integration, see Ernst Haas and Philippe
Schmitter, “Economic and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in
Latin America,” International Organization, 18, no. 4 (Autumn 1964); Ernst Haas, “The „Uniting
of Europe‟ and the Uniting of Latin America,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 5 (June 1967);
Philippe Schmitter, “Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neofunctionalism,” Journal of European
Public Policy 12, no. 2 (April 2005); Ernst Haas, “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections
on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing,” in Regional Integration, ed. Leon Lindberg and Stuart
Scheingold (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3-42.
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(1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to
conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each
other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the
decision-making process to new central organs; and (2) the process
whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded
to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center.11
[original emphasis]
Similarly to Haas, Lindberg perceives regional integration, particularly
European integration, as a process rather than a condition. Both scholars see
political integration as a result of economic integration, which is fueled by the
logic of “spillover.” “Spillover” is noticeable when integration of one sector
creates pressure, which then pushes states to integrate other sectors. This snowball
effect has metamorphosed into three variants of “spillover:” functional, political
and cultivated.12 Functional “spillover” refers to a process where harmonization in
one segment of policymaking moves to cooperative activities in other sectors,
which are closely linked to the former integrated sector.13 As Neill Nugent
summarizes, political “spillover” describes the process, where: national elites14
turn their attention to supranational levels of activity and decision making. They
become favorably disposed toward the integration process and the upgrading of
common interests. Subsequently, the supranational institutions and nongovernmental actors become more influential in the integration process, while the

11

Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1963), 6.
12
This three-layered distinction has not been originally defined by Haas or Lindberg, but adopted
by other scholars; i.e. see Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
13
Cram, “Integration Theory,” 58.
14
Haas dealt almost exclusively with non-governmental elites, whereas Lindberg stressed the
importance of governmental elites in the political “spill-over.”
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nation states and governmental actors become less influential.15 Finally, cultivated
“spillover” deals with the importance of the central institutions, strongly
emphasized by both Haas and Lindberg in their findings.
As Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, a more contemporary neofunctionalist
scholar, mentions, Haas and Lindberg assert that the central institutions serve as
“midwives” for the integration process through embodying common interests of
the member states.16 Tranholm-Mikkelsen concludes that the mechanisms of
“spillover,” which reinvigorated the neofunctionalist theory in the 1980s (after the
stagnation of European integration in the late 1960s and the 1970s), have made
neofunctionalism “indispensable” for the analysis of regional integration.17
Supranationalism
The theory of supranationalism builds on the neofunctionalist approach,
mainly because the latter view endorses supranational governance and serves as a
mother theory to the former framework. Indisputably, Jean Monnet has been
considered as one of the founding fathers of the European Community and an
influential scholar in contributing to the theory of supranationalism. In his work
titled A Ferment of Change (1962), the French civil servant and diplomat projects
a necessity of European nation states to adopt common rules governing their
behavior and create centralized institutions in order to avoid future continental
conflicts. Nonetheless, Monnet does not refer to a centralized, federal-like
government with exclusive powers. He perceives the process of integration as a
15

Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1999), 507.
16
Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neofunctionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?” Millennium: Journal
of International Studies 20, no. 1 (1991): 6.
17
Ibid.
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means of creating a “supranationalized” unity of states with common institutions
facilitating the process of decision making.18
Similarly, Rafael Leal-Arcas summarizes supranationalism as a system
where the member states still have power, which is then shared with other actors.
Since majority voting becomes the main decision-making mechanism, a member
state with an opposing decision finds itself pushed by other actors to agree on a
final outcome. Each nation state joins the European Union on voluntary basis, and
thus may leave it anytime it desires.19 Although skeptics have often voiced fears
of the loss of national sovereignty to the centralized institutions, the scholar
correctly used the key term “voluntarism” in describing the European project.
Another renowned institutionalist scholar, Joseph Weiler, defines
supranationalism as not merely a phenomenon “over and above individual
states.”20 Drawing upon Haas and Monnet‟s definitions, Weiler accredits the
presence of national governments as influential in and accountable for European
integration. The scholar divides European integration into two processes:
normative and decisional. The former type of supranationalism refers to a
relationship between the Community policies and member states‟ competing
policies.21 One can notice a hierarchical dichotomy between the European level
and national level policies. Moreover, the decisional supranationalism constitutes

18

Jean Monnet, “A Ferment of Change” in The European Union: Readings on the Theory and
Practice of European Integration, ed. Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb (Boulder;
London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994), 20.
19
Rafael Leal-Arcas, “Theories of Supranationalism in the EU,” Bepress Legal Series, paper 1790
(2006): 5, http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8481&context=expresso (accessed
August 5, 2009).
20
Joseph Weiler, “The Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, Yearbook of
European Law 1 (1981): 267.
21
Ibid., 271.
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the political approach. It defines the way in which decision-making processes are
executed at the European level.22
More contemporary theorists have attempted to emphasize the role played
by the EU institutions and the presence of multi-level governance in the European
Union. Wayne Sandholtz, a supranationalist successor of neofunctionalists, rejects
the intergovernmental view of the EU as a bargaining forum for its member states.
Sandholtz sees the EU institutions as powerhouses, sharing interests of the
member states and defining paths of political influence.23 According to him, the
central institutions have had a substantial dominance to influence political
behavior of the actors. They have not only transformed into autonomous bodies,
but also shaped opinions for the member states and introduced changes at the
domestic level.24 Aligning with the original theory of supranationalism, Sandholtz
sees the European Commission and the European Court of Justice as architects of
compromises between the states. The scholar provides empirical evidence to
underline the institutions‟ leading roles. He argues that the EU has in fact been
capable of changing domestic policies by enmeshing in national politics. The
member states may change their viewpoints as a result of the EU institutions‟
scope of influence over their decisions.25 Sandholtz claims that when there is a
common policy that a member state dislikes, it is unlikely to withdraw because it

22

Ibid.
Wayne Sandholtz, “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European
Institutions,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3 (September 1996): 405.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., 426.
23
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would also abandon other bargains that produce benefits in its various domestic
sectors.26
Intergovernmentalism
In contrast to the above institutionalist theories, Stanley Hoffman argues
that nation-states are the basic units in world politics.27 While classical
neofunctionalism has placed a passive role to the member states by focusing more
on the EU institutions as powerhouses, Hoffman‟s intergovernmentalist critique
emphasizes the role of national governments as promoters of the interests of the
people.28 National governments have been more “obstinate” than “obsolete” in the
process of European integration, thus challenging the snowball effect of
cooperation proposed by neofunctionalists.29 According to Hoffman, diversity of
national interests would set limits to “spillover” because national governments
would not compensate their losses by gains in other areas.30 Additionally, “high
politics” like foreign, security and defense policies, unlike “low politics” of
economic and welfare policies, would be least likely to undergo political
integration due to the high political salience.
Moreover, Hoffman‟s work analyzes the connotation of the phrase
“upgrading the common interest.” Haas and Lindberg understand the creation of a
political community through pooling common interests and “upgrading” them
through supranational advocacy. However, Hoffman asserts that the common

26

Ibid.
Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 2000), 76.
28
Cram “Integration Theory,” 60.
29
Ibid.
30
Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western
Europe,” Daedalus 95, no. 2 (Spring 1966): 882.
27
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interest is in reality an interest of a single nation state, most likely the most
predominant one.31 The scholar raises a rhetorical question of what is truly the
common interest. At the time of his writing, Hoffman states that the European
Community is still in the realm of “strategic-diplomatic behavior” where rules of
the game apply.32 Each country‟s interests reflect different concerns, favored by
domestic incongruence. The envisioned political unification could have smoothly
succeeded if nation states truly shared concerns, without diverging foreign
policies.33
Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Drawing on Hoffman‟s theory, Moravcsik develops a more pluralist
theoretical framework, which he names liberal intergovernmentalism. His novel
approach to the importance of state-centrism has received a great deal of attention
since its emergence in the 1990s. Similarly to Hoffman‟s arguments, Moravcsik
criticizes supranational dimensions of neofunctionalism.34 The scholar defines the
European Union as a series of intergovernmental negotiations.35
Liberal intergovernmentalism is based on two assumptions about politics:
the rationality of state behavior and states‟ role as actors. The assumption that
states are rational is a basic aspect of the theory. Moravcsik and Paul

31

Stanley Hoffman, “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial International
System,” International Organization 17, no.3 (Summer 1963): 527.
32
Ibid.
33
Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete?” 863.
34
Steve Smith, “International Theory: European Integration,” in International Relations Theory
and the Politics of European Integration, ed. Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London:
Routledge, 2000): 45.
35
Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no.4 (December, 1993):
473.

16

Schimmelfenning argue that states are actors in the world of politics. 36 Countries
have been capable of achieving goals through intergovernmental negotiations and
bargaining, rather than through a central authority in charge of making and
enforcing decisions.37 They have also continued to enjoy decision-making power
and political legitimacy, even when being members of the European entity.
Moreover, the liberal intergovernmentalist framework focuses on three
fundamental phases of negotiations: national preference formation, interstate
bargaining, and institutional choice.38 The liberal theory of national preferences
applies the theory of international relations and focuses on the state-society
relations in shaping domestic preferences. Private individuals, voluntary
associations, civil society, and et cetera have lobbied national governments and
formulated choices and desires of the nation states. Their interests are articulated
and pushed forward. Governments then determine preferences based on these
domestic groups. Certain sub-groups within the interest domestic groups have a
multitude of benefits to gain or lose in a certain policy. Therefore these lobbyists
may become the most viable ones in the formation of preferences.39
Furthermore, the interstate negotiations are embedded in a bargaining
theory of international cooperation. The latter theory indicates that the outcome of
international negotiations depends on the relative bargaining power of the
actors.40 The interstate bargain outcomes are conclusively shaped by the nation
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states, whose powers collide asymmetrically. In his book, Moravcsik portrays
how intensive bargaining may create threats of veto proposals, withholding of
financial side-payments, or alternative alliance formations.41 Also, if one nation
state depends more on a given agreement, it will be more prone to compromise in
order to achieve envisioned goals.
Institutional choice includes a dilemma of pooling and delegation of
sovereignty, which encompasses qualified majority voting and ceding of decisionmaking powers to the supranational institutions. Basing their argument on
neoliberal institutionalism developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,42
Moravcsik and Schimmelfenning argue that international institutions are in fact
necessary for durable international cooperation. Pooling and delegation of
authority to the EU institutions helps the nation states to reach a superior outcome
by reducing the transaction costs. Additionally, domestic actors who benefit from
common policies and compliance have advocated for pooling and/or delegation of
powers.43
The Timing of European Cooperation in the Area of Immigration Policy
With regards to initiation of the cooperation in the 1980s, institutionalist
scholars point to the “spillover” mechanism, whereas state-centric scholars have
underlined a rather intergovernmental pattern. In their descriptive chapter on the
theory of neofunctionalism, Arne Niemann and Philippe C. Schmitter examine
likely cases for the “spillover” conditions. According to their evaluation, internal
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market “spilled over” to the area of Justice and Home Affairs. If the Single
Market was to be completed, certain measures were necessary in areas of visa,
asylum, immigration and police cooperation.44 Moreover, David Mutimer adds
that abolition of physical barriers and border controls by the Single Market
facilitated free movement of people. According to him, dismantling of internal
borders would affect the area of immigration in order to control the flows of
people, most particularly the undocumented ones.45 Mutimer‟s ambitious and
persuasive study shows that a political entity would indisputably follow an
economic and political unification.46
Yet another support for the “spillover” effect is introduced in Chien-Yi
Lu‟s work. The author traces a number of initiatives for collective migration
policymaking in the history of European integration though analysis of rationales
behind them. The scholar argues that the increasing cooperation in the field is
found in “spillover” effects, elite advocacy and support of technocrats,47 thus
promoting a supranationalist outlook on integration of migration policies.
To name just a few scholars in the field of international migration,
Andrew Gebbes, Dietmar Herz and Virgine Guiraudon present an alternative
account to the timing of European cooperation. Although the Single Market
provided an impetus to the harmonization of immigration and asylum fields,
Gebbes adds that “it is rather difficult to argue that the SM alone caused this
44
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cooperation, which had begun to develop prior to the Single European Act (SEA)
and was linked to attempts to consolidate control over international migration.”48
Herz, another intergovernmentalist scholar, asserts that, in fact, the first step of
the European migration policy harmonization clearly resembled an
intergovernmental pattern, rather than “spillover.” Herz underlines the FrancoGerman initiative as a starting point of the policy development in the 1980s.49
Similarly to Herz, Moravcsik also focuses on the negotiating power of
France, Germany, and also Britain, but with respect to the Single European Act of
1987. Moravcsik describes the SEA as a union of elites between Community
officials and European business interest groups. Its negotiating history is more
consistent with an alternative explanation that European reform rested on
interstate bargains between the three mentioned super states.50 His findings
configure that the SEA was not a result of the “spillover” mechanism. Instead,
intergovernmentalism, lowest-common-denominator bargaining, and protection of
sovereignty played decisive role in the implementation of the SEA.51 The scholar
claims that the primary motivations of the member states are rooted in
convergence of national economic preferences.52 Such an argument relates to
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Gebbes and Herz‟s assertions about rationales behind the timing of the
cooperation in the immigration arena.
Unlike the previously-mentioned scholars, Guiraudon rejects both the
“spillover” mechanism and pure interstate bargaining. She describes both theories
as inadequate to provide analytical tools. Instead, the scholar generates the theory
of “venue-shopping” and describes how political actors seek policy venues, where
the balance of forces favors their ideal policy outcomes. Thus, governments have
circumvented national constraints on migration control by creating transnational
cooperation mechanisms dominated by law and order officials in transgovernmental working groups. Moreover, similarly to intergovernmentalist
advocates, Guiraudon gives the EU institutions only a minor role.53
The Process of the Harmonization of Immigration Policies
The development of a “common” immigration policy has followed a rather
slow and winding pathway. Gebbes is one among experts who describe it as an
incremental progress, coupled with reluctance of the member states to empower
the supranational institutions.54 He introduces four periods of EU cooperation in
the field of immigration and asylum. He argues that the recent period of
communitarization, which was initiated by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, did
not “supranationalize” the immigration regime. Martin A. Schain makes a similar
assessment of the policy harmonization. The year 1999 showed a considerable
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progress in the fight against illegal immigration and external border controls.55
However, previous years revealed very limited cooperation at the EU level. In her
2000 work, Guiraudon also mentions that the harmonization process remains
largely intergovernmental, where the EU institutions have in fact played a minor
role. In addition, Gallya Lahav, a leading researcher of European immigration
politics, shows that despite progress toward a “common” immigration policy, the
nation states still resist in many respects, thus revealing that their national-level
interests and decision making remain crucial.56
In another influential article, Gebbes takes the argument into a new
direction and asserts that, in fact, EU cooperation has helped the member states to
consolidate more regulation of international migration via the gradual
harmonization of national-level immigration policies.57 Moreover, the scholar
perceives the European coordination through the state-centric prism. He argues
that the EU has still allowed the pursuit of “selfish” interests of the member
states. 58
To the contrary of the above scholarship, which attributes active role of
the member states in the process of European integration, Sandholtz recognizes
the EU institutions as drivers of integration. Sandholtz mostly attributes power to
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, even arguing that
such institutions can, in fact, shape national governments and thus define their
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interests.59 The scholar openly criticizes liberal intergovernmentalism, which,
according to him, is a mere account of state-to-state bargaining. The state-centric
theory not only excludes everyday policymaking and solely focuses on treaties,
but also underestimates the role that states‟ interests and preferences are shaped
by the membership.60
Several authors referenced in this research stress that the process of the
communitarization of immigration policies has followed a restrictive pattern. In
their persuading article, Terri Givens and Adam Luedtke argue that when political
salience is high (like in the case of immigration issues), national governments
either block harmonization, or allow only restrictive pathway of harmonization at
the EU level.61 Schain makes a similar observation. He claims that, although
progress has been noticeable with regards to the fight against illegal immigration
and border control, failure to harmonize immigration policies stems from the fact
that if cooperation takes place, it tends to support control and exclusion, rather
than expansion and harmonization.62 Lahav also questions the outcome of the
ongoing harmonization of immigration policies. According to her evaluation, the
European Union resembles a hybrid of intergovernmentalism and
supranationalism in the field of migration regime. Thus, a potential “common”
immigration policy would be rather restrictive in nature.63
The EC/EU’s Influence on the Spanish Immigration Laws and Policies
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A body of scholarship has focused on the EU institutions‟ influence on the
member states‟ policymaking. Generally, this top-down process has been called
Europeanization. With regards to Spain, its accession to the European Community
(EC) in 1986 has not only legitimized its then-recent transition to democracy, but
also allowed Europe to exert substantial impact on its national policies and
legislations. Experts on Spanish immigration have presented mixed opinions
regarding the timing of the country‟s first immigration law in the mid-1980s.
Wayne Cornelius argues that immigration policy in Spain arose from the EC
pressure;64 and Gemma Pinyol pinpoints that Spain needed to meet the
Community standards.65 In addition, Francisco Javier Moreno Fuentes asserts that
LO 7/1985, the first immigration focusing on the rights and liberties of the
foreigners in Spain, was nothing more than placing Spain as a gatekeeper of the
EC‟s southern border. Similarly to Pinyol‟s argument, the document‟s
restrictiveness and focus on border controls did not correspond with the migratory
processes that were affecting Spain at that time.66
The early 1990s continued to portray the EU‟s impact on Spanish
policymaking. Expiration of the country‟s agreements with Morocco and Tunisia
for mutual suppression of visas coincided with the EU‟s pressure for the control
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of external borders. Moreno Fuentes asserts that this change related to
immigration policies designed at the EU level. Toughened external frontiers also
appeared as a precondition for the incorporation of Spain into the Schengen
Agreement in 1992.67 Moreover, Kitty Calavita, whose work focuses on
immigration and integration policies in Spain, adds that despite the stepped-up
pressure from the EU before Spain‟s signature under the Schengen Agreements in
1992, visa requirements, in fact, followed new controls against countries, which
were the source of large numbers of illegal residents.68
EU directives and regulations could be regarded as a major step toward the
supranationalization of national policies. In terms of binding documents in the
area of immigration and asylum, Spain has been a pioneer in transposing them
within general reforms of their immigration law. In her chapter, Margit Fauser
argues that Spain has followed a rather selective pathway of Europeanization.
That said, its central government has selectively chosen conclusions and
objectives reached at the EU level (at times non-binding).69 Fauser names a
number of recent Council directives since 2000, which became a part of the third
Spanish immigration law - LO 14/2003.
In other words, the EU‟s impact on Spanish policymaking has revealed a
“pick-and-choose” nature, where the central government has applied EU
objectives and (empathically) directives/regulations, when and where needed.
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Ryan Newton‟s research clearly reveals this selectiveness with regard to nonbinding conclusions of the Tampere Summit. As he shows, the Tampere
objectives were incorporated into the Spanish legal code in order to further restrict
policies affecting illegal immigration and external border controls. The
administration of former Prime Minister José María Aznar used the Tampere
Summit conclusions as a scapegoat for advancing its own national agenda.70
Spain’s Impact on the EU Policy Development
Two prominent scholars on Spain‟s membership in the European Union
and its impact on both Spain itself and the EU, Carlos Closa and Paul M.
Heywood, devote a chapter of their book on Spain‟s intergovernmentalist
approach to policymaking at the EU level.71 They present three dimensions that
support intergovernmentalist interpretation. Firstly, Spain has engaged in “insider
policies,” by placing nationals in key positions in Brussels in order to help to
shape policy from the inside. Secondly, use of the EU Presidency has steered
policies in a particular direction. Thirdly, Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs),
which occur before treaty amendments and enlargements, have been used to
pursue national interests.72 Therefore, they show how the Spanish government has
taken advantage of its role as an international player.
Historically speaking, the active participation in the construction of a
“common” immigration policy officially dates back to the Spanish Presidency of
70
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the EU in 2002.73 Pinyol asserts that the Presidency and the Seville Summit
outlined the country‟s intention to place immigration issues as a top priority on
the EU agenda.74 In her article, Elisabeth Johannson- Nogués shows how the
Presidency was used as a way to coordinate the member states on issues related to
this Spanish dilemma.75 Moreover, Closa and Heywood also see the 2002
Presidency as an arena to prioritize immigration and asylum policies.76
As Fauser states, the EU Presidency not only emphasized the need to
address growing concerns related to illegal immigration and external border
controls, but also used the Seville Summit‟s conclusions to initiate an introduction
of a new Council Directive 2004/82 on the obligation of carriers to communicate
passenger data. The Directive aimed at harmonizing carriers‟ financial penalties
provided for by the member states. Fauser also emphasizes that the Seville
conclusions were a mere continuation of the Tampere objectives. 77
Carmen González Enríquez and Alicia Sorroza Blanco from the Real
Instituto Elcano assert that Spain promoted FRONTEX (2004) and the Global
Approach (2005), which had a clear Spanish stamp on them. The authors add that
Spain has in fact been one of the building blocks of a harmonized approach to
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address immigration, especially with regards to external border controls and
illegal immigration.78
Some scholars in the field of the Spain‟s role on EU policymaking have
focused on plausible rationales behind such an active advocacy for the “common”
immigration policy development. Closa and Heywood conclude that Spain has
been able to use the EU as an effective tool to resolve its domestic issues, mainly
through developing ideas and concepts, which are now embedded into EU
policies.79 As I already referenced, Newton gives a similar account by analyzing
the Spanish government‟s adoption of the Tampere Summit‟s conclusions. He
clearly presents that Spain incorporated the non-binding Tampere objectives into
its legal body (the third immigration law - LO 8/2000) and used it as justification
for more restrictive reforms.80
Several internal and external socio-economic and cultural events that took
place in the recent years have also become excuses for introducing tougher stance
on illegal immigration. One of such circumstances was the El Ejido crime, where
a Moroccan immigrant murdered a young Spanish woman. As Ricard ZapataBarrero argues, this unfortunate event not only ignited anti-immigrant revolts, but
also placed immigration under socio-political agenda. As the general election
approached, the conservative political party, the Partido Popular (PP), politicized
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the event for its mere electoral profit.81 The PP capitalized on the public‟s
discontent with immigration and linked it to the upcoming elections and
legislation. This highly publicized tragedy benefited the right-wing party, which
found a solid ground to further restrict the immigration law.82
On the other hand, Zapata-Barrero and Nynke de Witte show how Spain
has raised awareness that illegal immigration is not just a Spanish problem, but
also a European one.83 Thus, such a transposition of a domestic issue onto the EU
level has encouraged the central government to seek a new problem-solving
venue. Laura Tedesco, who focuses on the recent economic crisis and its
challenges to Spanish immigration policies, argues that utilization of the EU as a
venue to fulfill domestic demands and preferences may become more pronounced
nowadays. Similarly to the Tampere Summit‟s conclusions, the Spanish
government can again argue that further restrictiveness is due to an essential step
to align national immigration policies with EU objectives.84
My Theoretical Position and Contribution
In this study, my argument is twofold: firstly, at the EU level, I follow
theoretical footsteps of intergovernmentalist scholars, like Gebbes and Herz, and
assert that the Single Market was not the major impetus, which caused
cooperation in the field of immigration. It was an intergovernmental pattern rather
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than the “spillover” mechanism. I also agree with immigration experts (Gebbes,
Schain, Lahav) who claim that the process of the “common” immigration policy
development has shown a very steady and restrictive pathway.
Secondly, I find arguments by Cornelius, Pinyol, and Moreno Fuentes
convincing with respect to the timing of the first Spanish immigration law. Upon
Spain‟s entrance to the European Community, the centralized institutions
pressured the country to implement a set of regulations that would target its
foreign population. Moreover, I fully agree with Closa and Heywood‟s argument
that Spain has been a pioneer in influencing the formation of EU objectives in the
arena of immigration. I call the Mediterranean country one of the leaders in the
process of EU policymaking because Spain has used the EU as an effective tool to
solve its domestic issues. With respect to the arena of illegal immigration and
external border controls, I focus on the EU and Spain‟s impact on each other‟s
policymaking. Thus, my thesis presents the country‟s extensive advocacy for a
restrictive, “communitarized” policy as a means to meet national demands.
To strengthen my hypothesis, I incorporate Moravcsik‟s three-tier
mechanism of EU negotiations: national preference formation, interstate
bargaining and institutional choice. Since Moravcsik‟s framework only focuses on
official negotiations between the member states, my work serves as an innovative
approach to Moravcsik‟s mechanism because I apply his theory at the national
level and examine Spain‟s impact on EU initiatives inside and outside of interstate
negotiations. Moreover, contrary to Moravcsik‟s attribution of a passive role to
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the electorate, I describe it as a very influential body in the process of national
preference formation and international negotiations.
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Chapter 3: Chronological Evolution of the Process of the
Development of a “Common” Immigration Policy
Above I outlined and scrutinized three of many theories of European
integration: neofunctionalism, supranationalism and (liberal)
intergovernmentalism. In this chapter, I introduce the evolution of the process of
the “common” immigration policy development with respect to the empowerment
of the EU institutions and the character of the “common” policy rhetoric. I explain
these phenomena across the three decades of their evolution: the 1980s, the 1990s,
and the 2000s. I follow each time framework by a subsection, which defines a
noticeable character of each period. Even though I include only a short paragraph
about the 1970s with respect to European integration, I focus mostly on the last
three decades. As I show below, the 1980s reveal restrictive intergovernmental
cooperation; the 1990s follow restrictive and mixed harmonization trend; finally,
the 2000s clearly portray further restrictive and gradual harmonization. This
chapter intends to show that Spain, as a nation state, has played a decisive role in
shaping the “common” immigration policy rhetoric based on its domestic
preferences.
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Map 1 - The European Union

Source: World Map Maker

European experience with immigration had not been of an alarming
concern up until the second half of the twentieth century. Migration to selected
Western European countries was mainly driven by economic and infrastructural
devastation caused by the two World Wars. The so-called “guest workers”
predominantly came from Southern European states. Instead of staying only
temporarily, the low-skilled laborers settled permanently in the new host
countries, usually industrialized countries in Northern and Western Europe.
Inflow of migrants after the Second World War, whether as asylum seekers or
laborers, accounted for elevated concerns among the EU heads of state and
government. That said such distress mobilized development of legal approaches
to deal with overstaying migrants and guest workers. According to Rainer Münz,
today‟s 27 EU member states had a total population of 415 million in 1960. The
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number has increased to over 495 million now.85 As of 2009, almost 31 million
people living in the European Union (EU27) are foreign-born migrants. That
number amounts for 6.2 percent of the total population.86
As the European population has significantly increased since the midtwentieth century, the period preceding a collective policy activity of the states in
the immigration arena has been characterized by minimal cooperation. I could
engage in an argument that the Treaties of Rome establishing the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community
(EURATOM) in 1957 marked a first attempt to prepare the European Community
for the establishment of a future “common” immigration policy. The Treaties of
Rome introduced the “free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital,”
the so-called “four freedoms,” which became a legal reality with the
implementation of the Single European Act of 1987. One of the freedoms is free
movement of workers (only EC-nationals) within the borders of the Community.
Such freedom complimented the economic structuring of a common market.87
Nationals of the establishing states gained access to employment and selfemployment in any of the signatory countries.88 The freedoms subscribed to the
ideology of supranationalism, envisioned by Schuman and Monnet, where, as I
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referenced, national control was transposed to the Community level. However,
lack of any substantive legal basis in the Treaties for the harmonization of
immigration policies alienated the policy from control and influence of the
supranational institutions in the 1960s and 1970s.
The 1970s – Stagnation of European Integration
The European Commission attempted to take over some aspects of illegal
immigration under the EC control as early as in the 1970s. The member states‟
reluctance to delegate their sovereign power over such sensitive issues resulted in
repetitive deferral of the communitarization of immigration policies. This
„Eurosclerosis‟ resulted from former French President Charles de Gaulle‟s
unwillingness to cede France‟s control over its vital affairs, which ultimately led
to the Luxembourg Compromise of 1965. The compromise re-introduced the
member states‟ right to veto decisions undertaken by the European Community.89
The intergovernmentalist sentiments of the late 1960s and 1970s could
have, in fact, considerably influenced such adverse national approaches to further
European integration. Nonetheless, the member states had managed to promote
cooperative actions outside of the Community structure, siding with
intergovernmental cooperation. To give an example, TREVI, whose acronym
stands for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, and International Violence, was
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formed in 1975 to cooperate on internal security measures. The group‟s tasks
eventually broadened in 1985-86 to include the fight against international crime.90
The 1980s – Re-Launching of the Integration Process
Despite of the 1979 oil crisis and the early 1980s economic stagnation of
the European countries, the further harmonization of policies was not much
affected by internal and external obstacles. The 1980s witnessed revival of
European integration. Completion of the Single Market, as being the largest
project, significantly influenced the political policy areas, which included the area
of immigration and asylum. This particular active engagement in the
harmonization process might have begun thanks to either the “spillover”
mechanism or mere interstate cooperation. Two crucial documents, which placed
emphasis on active collaboration in the immigration realm, were the Schengen
Agreements of 1985 and the amendment of the Treaties of Rome- the Single
European Act (SEA) of 1987.
In 1986, the TREVI/Interior Ministers set up yet another
intergovernmental body, the Ad Hoc (Working) Group on Immigration
(AHWGI/AHGI). A myriad of the AHWGI/AHGI groups and subgroups
improved checks at external borders of the European Community, coordinated
visa policies and combated passport fraud. The creation of the AHWGI/AHGI
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stemmed from a potential link between terrorism and border controls/immigration
policies.91
The Schengen Agreements- 1985
A first, official step toward the harmonization of immigration policies was
undertaken by the Schengen Agreements initially signed in June 1985 by five core
EC countries: France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.92 As
Guiraudon asserts, “there was no formal intergovernmental cooperation on the
subject [of immigration] before the 1985 Schengen Agreement and no EU
competence for immigration policy before 1992.”93 The signatory countries
launched a joint agreement outside of the EC framework. Due to British and Irish
opposition to cooperation in immigration issues, Germany and France succeeded,
driven by their domestic interests, to implement the Schengen Agreements as an
alternative to a Community solution.94 In 1990, the member states signed yet
another agreement titled the Schengen Convention, often referred to as Schengen
II. The document focused on application of the internal border elimination and
free movement provisions outlined in the original Schengen document.
Ultimately, the year of 1995 officially abolished border controls.95 Schengen
Information System (SIS I) became also operational in 1995. It was a
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sophisticated database used by authorities of the Schengen member countries to
exchange data on certain categories of people and goods.
Although the Schengen Agreements prospered outside of the EC structure,
their formulation served as a template for further Community establishment of
specific measures in the early 1990s after introduction of the internal market. That
being said, Schengen became a precursor to internal and mutual cooperation
based on the Single Market. The initial aim of the Schengen Agreements was to
make a speedier progress in dismantling internal frontiers, originated as a reaction
to roadblocks set up by trucks at internal borders.96 Migration developed as a
national concern only later.
The Schengen regime targeted the securing or strengthening of external
borders in order to diminish the influx of illegal immigrants, especially after the
fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe.97 Illegal immigration became
an expensive challenge to the signatory countries. The Schengen Agreements
sought to enhance the patrol of external borders and impose more rigid controls
against countries outside of Schengen.98 As Lahav argues, “the evolution of
Schengen captures the restrictive implications of coordination for migration.”99 In
a sense, abolishing the internal borders of the Schengen zone led to immigration
policy restrictions due to the “porous” nature of internal frontiers and control of
occasionally permeable external borders. In Article 7 under Title I, Schengen
reads as follows:
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The Parties shall endeavour to approximate their visa policies as
soon as possible in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the
field of immigration and security that may result from easing
checks at the common borders. They shall take, if possible by 1
January 1986, the necessary steps in order to apply their
procedures for the issue of visas and admission to their territories,
taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire
territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities
which could jeopardize security.100
The above article calls for visa harmonization to avoid negative consequences that
would result in the removal of internal borders.101 Common visa policies would
correlate with the harmonized immigration approach through implementation of a
list of third countries whose nationals required visas to enter the Schengen area.
As the mid-1980s acutely shifted an outlook on international migration, Schengen
became a pioneer of the intensified European illegal immigration stance.
The Single European Act- 1987
On July 1, 1987 the Single European Act (SEA) marked a profound
deepening of the envisioned common market, but this time under the Community
framework. The White Paper presented by the European Commission to the
European Council of Ministers during the Milan Summit in June 1985 outlined
about 300 legislative proposals for creation of the Single Market.102 Based on this
document, the European Community aimed at establishing the goal by December
31, 1992.
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Article 8A of the SEA envisioned an area without internal frontiers. It
declares, “The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.”103 The SEA underlined an
objective of creating a market, which would be unattainable without
implementation of the “four freedoms” of movement. Thanks to the “freedom of
labor,” the communitarization of immigration policies was given priority for
further development. However, the SEA did not introduce substantial provisions
that would transfer control over immigration policies to the supranational level.
As Callovi mentions, with respect to migration, the SEA only concentrated on
problems related to the removal of physical controls.104 General Declaration on
Articles 13 to 19 clearly states:
Nothing in these provisions shall affect the right of Member States
to take such measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of
controlling immigration from third countries, and to combat
terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in works of
art and antiques.105
According to this statement, the European Community did not gain substantive
competence over immigration policies of the member states. Based on both
Schengen and the Single European Act, Callovi argues that a harmonized policy
on border controls had been technically feasible without the creation of a
“common” immigration policy.106 Roger Hansen makes a similar observation in
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terms of a common market. He asserts that a customs union could in fact deliver
substantial payoffs without creation of a political union.107
As already referenced, the SEA confirmed “four freedoms” enshrined in
the Treaties of Rome.108 Nationals of the EC member states could freely move
across borders of the member countries. As Lahav emphasizes, the word “people”
was not intended to address all residents. Thus, the SEA legislation was only
applicable to EC nationals and their families.109 Reasons behind exclusion of the
third-country nationals lay in expansive interpretation of the Article 8A
mentioned above.
The 1985 Commission‟s Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration
focused on three main areas where the Commission intended to focus on:
development of Community legislation for migrants who are
citizens of Member States; consultation between Member States
and the Commission on problems faced by migrants and
introduction of Community guidelines to deal with such problems;
information for migrants and action to make them aware of their
rights.110
As the Commission formulated the first guidelines for a unified policy on
migration issues, the member states‟ resistance to integration in areas of “high
politics” (visa, asylum policies, and the status of non-EC nationals) was evident in
the rejection of a common approach to immigration and asylum policies. The
1980s cooperation in the migration field unfolded outside of the EU institutions.
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This observation brings to discussion Hoffman‟s intergovernmentalist skepticism
of the nation states‟ sovereignty loss over highly sensitive areas of politics.
As the free movement of EC nationals fell under the competencies of the
European Commission and the European Court of Justice, the European Council
of Ministers retained unanimity regarding the right of non-EC nationals to move
unconditionally across the borders. Additionally, immigration and asylum policies
continued to remain outside of the EC framework. Individual member states
enjoyed national control over the entrance of foreigners to their territories. Under
the SEA, the European Commission was only loosely associated with
intergovernmental cooperation of the member states in the migration area,
whereas the supranational European Court of Justice and the European Parliament
were mainly excluded. The SEA created the “cooperation” procedure in the
Parliament, which increased its weight in the legislation process. However, its
power remained modest until the introduction of the “co-decision I” through the
Treaty of the European Union (1993), and the “co-decision II” through the Treaty
of Amsterdam (1999), which made the European Parliament a bigger player in
EU politics. Both Schengen and the SEA pursued market integration in addition
to restrictive immigration and asylum policies.111 The SEA, as well as Schengen
to an extent, initiated a very slow and incremental movement toward the final
product of a “communitarized” immigration policy.
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The 1980s- Restrictive Intergovernmental Cooperation
The early 1980s reflected integration stagnation and economic slowdown
in Western Europe and the European Community. While the recession created
soaring rates of inflation and unemployment, the East-West tension only
amplified. Increased rate of immigration had grown out of control and it was
politically untenable to sustain inflow of labor migration.112 Gebbes coined four
periods of the European Community cooperation development in the immigration
area. The first period incorporated years between 1957 and 1986. From the
Treaties of Rome until the Single European Act (exclusively), the European
Community witnessed a “minimal immigration policy involvement.”113 During
this time span, intergovernmental cooperation in the immigration sphere
flourished through inter-state coordination. The second period, “informal
intergovernmentalism,” encompassed a period from 1986 to 1993. This phase was
initiated by the Single European Act. As Gebbes states, “states were keen to
pursue their domestic immigration control objectives at the EU level without
empowering the EU institutions.”114 As the post-SEA period showed, the member
states exhibited skepticism with regards to ceding competencies to the
supranational institutions. Several intergovernmental groups, whose objectives
concentrated on external border controls, asylum, deportations, and terrorism,
continued to favor intergovernmentalism and minimal Community influence on
the process of the development of a “common” immigration policy.
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Reluctance to granting control to the EC institutions correlated with
interstate cooperation, and resulted in restrictive measures in the migration sphere,
particularly with regards to illegal migration and external border patrols. The
Iranian oil crisis of 1979 affected the economic recovery in Europe.115 Most
Western European countries introduced strict, national immigration regulations in
the 1970s, using the oil crisis as a pretext to tackle immigration burden.
The socio-economic situation of the 1980s mobilized the EC member
states to cooperate in the migration sphere in order to restrict certain policies
through the harmonization process. This cooperation unfolded mainly outside of
the EU institutions. However, as Gebbes argues, the European Community served
as a “new venue” for the pursuit of domestic policy objectives116 - objectives that
projected national demands of the nation states. The member states reconciled
with the definition of the envisioned immigration cooperation as rather restrictive
and intergovernmental.
The 1990s – Mixed Harmonization of the Immigration Arena
The early 1990s witnessed a new period of deeper political integration.
The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the process of German unification
speeded up implementation of yet another treaty amendment that would not only
deal with external political and economic events, but also with internal
strengthening of the Single Market. The collapse of the Iron Curtain manifested
into a massive movement of migrants from the East to West. This predictable
diaspora markedly invigorated further policy restrictions in the immigration
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sphere.117 Governments of the member states rationalized the upcoming treaty as
a legitimate document, which addressed the ongoing immigration dilemma at the
EU level. Several ad hoc intergovernmental groups in the post-SEA period lacked
adequate proposals and thus the subsequent treaty raised hopes for further
harmonization.
The Treaty of the European Union - 1993
The Treaty of the European Union (TEU) entered into force on November
1, 1993. Unlike the Single European Act, the TEU formalized cooperation on
immigration by placing it under one of three newly created pillars- the semiintergovernmental (hybrid) pillar of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).
Although the pillar was placed under the EU roof, aspects of immigration policy
were a subject to a “common interest” rather than a “common policy.”118 The
“common interest” under Title IV, Article K1, includes:
Asylum policy; rules governing the crossing by persons of the
external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls
thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third
countries: a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of
third countries on the territory of Member States; b) conditions of
residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member
States, including family reunion and access to employment; c)
combating unauthorized immigration, residence and work by
nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States.119
These points, as Brochmann adds, represented an extension of the areas covered
by the extra-Community Schengen Agreements. The TEU also introduced a
concept of “people‟s Europe,” which involved the notion of European citizenship,
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which would be granted to prospective EU nationals. Moreover, the name change
from the European Community to the European Union indicated nothing more
than further social, political and economic integration.
Brochmann sees the TEU as a political will of the then twelve member
states to develop a prospective “common” immigration policy.120 In terms of
migration, the TEU compromised between principles of intergovernmentalism
and supranationalism. The member states retained their traditional authority over
certain aspects of immigration and asylum policies addressed in the third pillar.
The “common interest” involved initiatives of both the European Commission and
the member states. According to the Article K3,
1. In the areas referred to in Article K.1, Member States shall
inform and consult one another within the Council with a view to
coordinating their action. To that end, they shall establish
collaboration between the relevant departments of their
administrations;
2. The Council may: on the initiative of any Member State or of
the Commission, in the areas referred to in Article K.1(1) to (6); on
the initiative of any Member State, in the areas referred to in
Article K1(7) to (9):
(a) adopt joint positions and promote, using the appropriate form
and procedures, any cooperation contributing to the pursuit of the
objectives of the Union;
(b) adopt joint action in so far as the objectives of the Union can
be attained better by joint action than by the Member States acting
individually on account of the scale or effects of the action
envisaged; it may decide that measures implementing joint action
are to be adopted by a qualified majority.
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The supranational side of the TEU allowed the “common interests” under the
Article K1 to be ultimately relocated under the Community pillar, potentially
extending the Community law to some areas of the JHA.121
Other scholars have had a less optimistic outlook on the TEU. Although,
for instance, it upgraded the role of the European Parliament, the TEU brought
victory to intergovernmentalism.122 Adam Luedtke states that,
The resulting Maastricht Treaty prevented immigration policy
from becoming „supranationalized‟ in four respects: 1) it allowed
member states the right of initiative to propose new EU-level
measures (in “normal” EU decision-making, it is only the
Commission who can propose new measures); 2) it allowed the
Parliament only the right to be “consulted” over decisions, but
gave it no veto or amendment power; 3) it prevented the ECJ from
having legal jurisdiction over immigration; and 4) it allowed any
member state to veto a proposed measure.123
As Lahav mentions, the communitarian approach that was adopted only facilitated
the free movement of EU citizens and their equal treatment within the EU;
immigration and asylum would be dealt at the intergovernmental level with the
JHA,124 leaving most significant issues (asylum, illegal migration, and visa
policies) of migration policy outside of the EU umbrella. Therefore, the Treaty of
the European Union formalized cooperation of immigration policies, but it did not
harmonize them due to sound opposition from some member states against giving
up competencies to the EU institutions. Nonetheless, the TEU drew the project of
the immigration harmonization near the envisioned supranational entity of the
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founding fathers due to its noticeable connection between internal free movement
and increased external border controls.125 Parameters of the “common”
immigration policy rhetoric began to evolve with an emphasis on selective
measures toward securitizing external frontiers from influx of illegal immigrants.
The Treaty of Amsterdam- 1997-1999
Central components of the discourse on the path to the Treaty of
Amsterdam revolved around immigration and asylum policies. The Treaty came
into force on May 1, 1999 and introduced a new Title IV Visas, Asylum,
Immigration and Other Policies Related to Free Movement of Persons. Under this
title, articles captured matters associated with asylum, immigration and external
border controls as contingent of Community procedures after five years (2004)
from the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam.126 With respect to the
immigration policy arena, Luedtke asserts that
It was agreed that after five years, the Commission would gain the
sole right of initiative, the Parliament would gain the power of „codecision,‟ the unanimity requirement (national veto) in the Council
would disappear, and decisions would thus be taken by a majority
vote (though this arrangement would have to be implemented by a
unanimous vote after the five-year transition period!). It was also
agreed to give the European Court of Justice jurisdiction over
immigration, though with a special exception, in that only high
courts could refer cases to the ECJ.127
Moreover, the European Court of Justice would only act on the basis of a referral
from the “high courts” in the member states.128
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From a perspective of pro-internationalists, the key achievements of the
Treaty of Amsterdam were creation of the area of freedom, justice and security,
and incorporation of “the Schengen acquis”129 into the EU framework. Significant
changes to the third pillar included transition of visa, asylum and immigration
policies, as well as judicial cooperation in civil matters, to the Community pillar.
Lahav defines this move as “a gradual step toward a supranational immigration
policy.”130 To the bewilderment of many, the Treaty of Amsterdam did not
“supranationalize” the immigration policy, but rather “communitarized” it.131
Luedtke states that the Treaty achieved only a partial supranationalization over
migration.132 Transfer of the Justice and Home Affairs significantly extended
tentacles of supranationalism. However, introduction of qualified majority voting
(QMV) in the European Council of Ministers would still have to be implemented
through a unanimous vote. Therefore, any member state, represented by its
national minister, would have a leeway to veto the proposal. Partially winning
institutions in the post-Amsterdam period were the European Commission and the
European Parliament -the two supranational EU institutions, which have been
more open to rights-oriented framework of a “common” immigration policy and
thus constituted excellent targets of pro-immigrant NGOs.133 The Treaty of
Amsterdam incorporated anti-discriminatory provisions (especially outlined in the
Article 13) and thus gave a more human face to the development of immigration
129
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and asylum policies at the EU level. Nonetheless, the overall approach to illegal
immigration continued to exert a restrictive nature. Since 1985, creation of the
migratory policy regime has pursued a limited and selective approach to treatment
of undocumented third country immigrants.
The Tampere Summit - 1999
Shortly after the introduction of the Treaty of Amsterdam, a meeting of
the EU heads of state and government was held in Tampere, Finland, on October
15-16, 1999. The meeting focused on the following themes: common asylum and
migration policies; a union-wide fight against crime; and a stronger external
action.134 One of the Tampere Summit‟s milestones outlines the following:

It would be in contradiction with Europe's traditions to deny
freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek
access to our territory. This in turn requires the Union to develop
common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into
account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop
illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it and
commit related international crimes. These common policies must
be based on principles which are both clear to our own citizens and
also offer guarantees to those who seek protection in or access to
the European Union.135
The Tampere Summit pointed out a mutual obligation to equally treat non-EU
nationals who stay within the EU borders. On the one hand, some of its objectives
aligned with the European Commission and the European Parliament‟s more
liberal and immigrant-friendly approach. On the other hand, the heads of state and
government projected a plan to curtail the inflow of illegal immigrants through
134
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tougher external border controls. An envisioned “common” immigration policy
would facilitate the control of inflowing immigrants by developing common
measures dealing with illegal border crossings.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Tampere Summit supported antidiscrimination provisions and the incorporation of non-EU citizens into the
mainstream society, it markedly underscored the restrictive nature of a projected
“common” migration policy. So far, the European treaties have guaranteed the
freedom of movement to all EU nationals, and for all non-EU nationals who
reside legally within the borders of the EU.136 This approach articulated a need to
combat illegal immigration and expel illegal migrants from the EU territory.
Additionally, despite repetitive efforts to formulate a supranational immigration
policy, the member states continued to address undocumented immigrants at the
national level through various measures, be it regularization programs, fixed
quotas on immigrants or mass deportation.137
The 1990s- Further Restrictive and Mixed Harmonization
The Treaty of the European Union initiated a novel momentum in the
immigration policy realm. It served as a jump start to Gebbes‟ third period of the
immigration cooperation development titled “formal intergovernmental
cooperation.” Most of the member states and the EU institutions have framed a
“common” immigration policy as a restrictive tool, which targeted uncontrolled
influx of the third-country nationals. With respect to migration, “fortress Europe”
continued to grow in the 1990s. Uncontrolled migrant inflows and permeable
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external borders had become of a disquieting concern for national policymakers,
politicians and EU officials in the early 1990s. Threats of migration from the
Central-Eastern Europe after the end of Cold War intensified a strict nature of
policymaking to tackle undocumented immigration.138 Before the 1990s, illegal
migration was generally defined as an inflow of foreigners who illegally
overstayed in a country of destination or who entered via unlawful routes. With
time, however, illegal immigration became to be perceived as a cause of drug
trafficking and international crime. This negative connotation was embedded in
the EU rhetoric, which labeled the threat of uncontrolled migration as startling.
The 2000s – More Pronounced Harmonization of the Immigration Arena
The twenty-first century not only escalated a number of inflowing
immigrants to certain European countries thanks to their economic prosperity, but
also the emergence of pronounced securitization of immigration policies.
Unilateral approach to illegal immigration has shown ineffectiveness; “porous”
external borders fueled further determination to bring immigration policies to the
EU level. As shown below, treaties, summits and programs implemented in the
2000s have resulted in the pronounced process of the development of a
“common” migration policy. The recent years have clearly demonstrated the
ongoing communitarization of the immigration policy area.139
The Treaty of Nice- 2001
Following the Amsterdam Treaty and the Tampere Summit, the Treaty of
Nice was signed on February 26, 2001 and entered into force two years later.
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Similarly to the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaty of Nice was an
immediate counter-reaction to political externalities. While the fall of
Communism impacted the reformist actions of the European Union in the early
1990s, the prospective EU accession of Eastern European countries (2004) also
invigorated necessary institutional reforms.140
Lahav describes this Treaty amendment as a building block of the
momentum toward supranationalization of the European Union and its member
states,141 which revealed the French leadership at work. It greatly extended
qualified majority voting (QMV) to various areas, including further measures to
facilitate the freedom of movement of EU nationals. Due to enduring reluctance
of the member states to transfer sovereignty in some sensitive areas, QMV was
deferred in the immigration and asylum realms. History has indeed repeated itself
when it comes to analyzing the Treaty of Amsterdam‟s postponement of the QMV
adoption. The switch to majority votes was deferred to 2004.142 Neither the
Treaty of Amsterdam nor the Treaty of Nice achieved this. Once again, some
member states took advantage of the unanimous voting in the European Council
of Ministers and rebuked plans of implementing QMV at the time of the Treaty
ratification. The Treaty of Nice, as Anna Kicinger and Katarzyna Saczuk mention,
did not bring any innovative changes in the field of immigration policy.143 Rather,
it concentrated on the extension of matters, which would be submitted to the

140

Europa, “Treaties and Law.”
Lahav, Immigration and Politics, 47.
142
Europa, “Summary of the Treaty of Nice,” January 31, 2001.
143
Anna Kicinger and Katarzyna Saczuk, “Migration Policy in the European PerspectiveDevelopment and the Future Trends,” CEFMR, working paper 1 (2004): 13,
http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_2004-01.pdf (accessed November 20, 2009).
141

53

majority voting procedure in the European Council of Ministers in next five years
following the signatory date.
The Laeken Summit- 2001
The “9/11” heightened security and immigration concerns among the
developed nation states. Following the Treaty at Nice, the European Council held
a Summit in Laeken, Belgium, on December 14-15, 2001. A major goal of the
Laeken Summit concentrated on strengthening and hastening common standards
on external border controls. The document‟s conclusion outlines the following
objectives:
Better management of the Union‟s external border controls will
help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks
and the traffic in human beings. The European Council asks the
Council of Ministers and the Commission to work out
arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for
external border control and to examine the conditions in which a
mechanism or common services to control external borders could
be created.144
In addition to border control, the EU heads of state and government stressed
the urgency to immediately adopt a “common” immigration policy on the basis of
the preceding Tampere Summit. The European Council aimed at the development
of a common system for exchanging information on asylum, migration and
countries of origin, and the establishment of specific programs to fight
discrimination and racism.145 Similarly to Tampere, Laeken outlined non-binding
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rhetorical goal, thus producing theoretical, rather than practical results, aftereffect
in the field of a “common” immigration policy. 146
The Seville Summit - 2002
Under the Spanish Presidency, the European Council meeting at the
Seville, Spain, on June 21-22, 2002 specifically focused on the need to establish a
“common” immigration policy.147 The Seville Summit agreed on “increased
security at external borders with joint operations at ports and airports; creation of
a special unit of heads of border control from the member states; new rules
encouraging increased penalties for people smuggling; a policy of speeded up
repatriations for those who do not qualify.”148 Repatriation included joint
strategies to work with migrant-sending countries.
The Seville Summit concretized the restrictive face of a “common”
immigration policy. Due to its toughened approach to illegal immigration, the
Seville Summit was accused of moving toward the negatively-connoted notion of
“fortress Europe.”149 Nonetheless, international events of the early-2000s excused
the Seville agenda and furthered securitization of the immigration issues with
more restrictions and control on inflowing numbers of third-country migrants.
The Hague Program- 2004-2009
The European Council meeting on November 4-5, 2004, in Brussels,
Belgium, followed very similar objectives of its preceding meetings. On May 10,
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2005 the European Commission presented a communication to the European
Council where it outlined ten priorities of the Hague Program for the next five
years (2004-2009). Some of the priorities included: fight against terrorism;
balanced approach to deal with legal and illegal immigration (especially
combating illegal immigration); controlling external borders and developing a
visa policy; and tackling organized crime. In terms of illegal immigration and
terrorism, the Presidency Conclusions clearly mentioned the negative outcomes of
post-“9/11” and Madrid terrorist attacks of 2004. The document states:
The security of the European Union and its Member States has
acquired a new urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist
attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 and in Madrid
on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe rightly expect the
European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental
freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to
cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and
smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well
as the prevention thereof.150
As can be inferred from the treaties and summits I have been discussing,
augmentation of a more coordinated EU approach to a “common” immigration
policy has retained a restrictive character, especially at the turn of the century
with external (“9/11”) and internal (Madrid 2004, Ceuta and Melilla 2005, and
London bombings 2005) factors. The process of the development of an envisioned
“common” immigration policy has gradually, albeit very moderately, evolved
with help of a number of supportive member states and EU officials. The Hague
Program only added teeth to the process of building the supranational
immigration empire.
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The Establishment of FRONTEX – 2004
In order to secure the free movement of persons within the EU, the
European Council, upon the proposal from the European Commission and opinion
from the European Parliament, passed a Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004,
which established a European Agency for the Management of Operational
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
(FRONTEX) in October, 2004. According to the main website of the agency,
FRONTEX‟s responsibility lies in “ensuring that the EU external borders remain
permeable and efficient for bona fide travelers while being an effective barrier to
cross-border crime.”151 FRONTEX could be regarded as a child of “the Schengen
acquis,” which has aimed at strengthening external borders through mutual
cooperation of the member states. In Chapter 2, Article 2, the Council Regulation
lists major tasks of FRONTEX. They are as follows:
(a) coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in
the field of management of external borders; (b) assist Member
States on training of national border guards, including the
establishment of common training standards; (c) carry out risk
analyses; (d) follow up on the development of research relevant for
the control and surveillance of external borders; (e) assist Member
States in circumstances requiring increased technical and
operational assistance at external borders; (f) provide Member
States with the necessary support in organising joint return
operations.152
It is crucial to mention that the independent FRONTEX does not
constitute a supranational institution per se. The responsibility for control and
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surveillance of external border lies within the sovereignty of the member states.153
The agency serves as an additional financial and physical assistance in cases of
inability to nationally deal with a burden of guarding external borders. Its budget
covers revenue from the EU budget.154 Border countries of Eastern, South-Eastern
and Southern Europe have greatly benefited from FRONTEX as an aid in fighting
against illegal inflows of immigrants. Its recent development, RABIT 2010
(Rapid Border Intervention Teams) has aimed at immediate deployment of trained
border guards in case of urgent and exceptional migratory pressure155 (i.e. Greece
situation in 2010 and North African revolutions in 2011).
The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum- 2008
Although the document I describe below is neither a treaty amendment nor
a resolution of the European Council summit meeting, it is noteworthy due to its
sequential contribution to the development of the “common” immigration policy
rhetoric. The EU heads of state and government adopted the so-called European
Pact on Immigration and Asylum (EPIA) on October 16, 2008. Similarly to the
previously-described documents, the document called for political rather than
legal force. In other words, it did not constitute a concretized basis for a
“common” immigration policy. The European Parliament, the European Council
of Ministers, the European Commission and the member states
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planned to implement the EPIA, which was a French initiative negotiated with
Spain and Germany.156 The French Presidency‟s main objective was to establish a
“common” immigration policy. Endorsement of this document had successfully
fulfilled some of French President Nicolas Sarkozy‟s reforms. According to
Sergio Carrera and Massimo Merlino, the EPIA embodied a nationalistic and
intergovernmental approach, which sought to legitimize certain French
immigration policies at the EU level.157
Page two of the document underlined negative consequences of illegal
immigration affecting the member states. One paragraph reads, “The majority of
European countries have to cope with illegal immigration, which is an obstacle to
the smooth integration of legal immigrants, and a cause of conflict. Governments
cannot settle for such a situation.”158 The EPIA commits its member states in five
key areas:
To organize legal immigration to take account of the priorities,
needs and reception capabilities determined by each Member State,
and to encourage integration; to control illegal immigration by
ensuring the return of illegal immigrants to their country of origin
or a country of transit; to make border controls more effective; to
construct a Europe of asylum; to create a comprehensive
partnership with countries of origin and transit to encourage
synergy between migration and development.159
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The latter objectives did not escape controversy due to their strong stance on
expulsion of illegal immigrants, which, as mentioned, reflected French domestic
interests. In spite of occurring opposition, all 27 member states agreed to follow
the objectives, perhaps climbing voluntarily toward the creation of a “common”
immigration policy.
The document targeted the unwanted immigrants who, by their illegal
status, contribute, politically and socio-economically, to problems at the national
and international levels. As already mentioned, the EPIA did not legally bind the
member states. Like the former treaties (specifically from 1993 and onward) and
summits (from 1999 and onward), this document haltingly furthered the
development of a unified migration policy. It could be said that the Treaty of
Lisbon is a product of two decades of negotiations and policymaking.
The Treaty of Lisbon- 2007-2009
The Treaty of Lisbon, initially signed on December 13, 2007 has ascended
the ladder of the prospective communitarization with respect to immigration
issues. Failure of the European Constitution of 2004, due to rejection of the
French and the Dutch voters in 2005, led to its replacement by the aforementioned
Treaty. The latter document did not succeed in the 2008 ratification because the
Irish electorate failed to accept its provisions. However, the Treaty of Lisbon
passed the second referendum in 2009 and entered into force on December 1,
2009 to the great benefit of the EU institutions.
The Treaty of Lisbon was a leap forward in the history of the development
of a “common” immigration policy. It introduced a profound reform in the sphere
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of illegal immigration. The Treaty of Lisbon confirmed a shared competence of
the EU and the member states over immigration issues. This situation did not
designate full legislative initiative to the European Commission. However, the
Treaty of Lisbon shifted from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the
European Council of Ministers and co-decision in the European Parliament. 160
The latter institution already has an equal say with national ministers in the areas
dealing with immigration, border controls, and visa issues. Nonetheless, the
Treaty of Lisbon will eventually empower the European Parliament with more say
in both legal and illegal migration measures.161 Qualified majority voting and codecision are already applicable in the legislative procedures in the illegal
immigration field and will be extended to the legal migration legislative actions.
This step in decision-making process debilitates voices of resentment of the
member states‟ officials in certain migration legislations. The reforms in the area
of freedom, security and justice have called for accelerated creation of “common”
immigration and asylum policies. Under General Provisions, Article 2 notes:
The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and
justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of
persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with
respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the
prevention and combating of crime.162
In case of a “common” immigration policy, the enhanced process of decision
making would allow the European Union and its member states to define the
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common rules and conditions of immigration. The planned switch to qualified
majority voting in the European Council of Ministers has furthered the ongoing,
albeit gradual, progress of the communitarization of immigration policies.
However, as Jörg Monar mentions, this process in policymaking had to be bought
at the price of extending the British and Irish opt-out in the former third-pillar
matters. Moreover, the Treaty did not remove “the tension between common
objectives on the one hand and the protection of national competences on the
other as this is exemplified by the maintenance of national control of values of
admission under the new common migration policy.”163
The Stockholm Program – 2010- 2014
Building on the Tampere Summit, the Hague Program, and the European
Pact on Immigration and Asylum, the recent Stockholm Program, which was
adopted by the EU heads of state and government in December 2009, focused on
the citizens' interests and needs and the added value that the European Union has
brought to its citizens. According to the European Council, fighting illegal
immigration is one of top priorities of the Stockholm Program. The EU should
improve coordination of its efforts and work on active partnership with the
countries of origin and of transit in order to encourage the synergy between
migration and development.164 It is noteworthy that the European Commission
contributed greatly to the final framework of the Stockholm Program. In its
Communication entitled An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice Serving the
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Citizen: Wider freedom in a Safer Environment, the European Commission
clearly emphasized that one of the challenges facing the EU would be a high
number of illegal immigrants residing in Europe. The Stockholm Program
incorporated such a concern with illegal foreigners and focused on “the citizens”
as being the heart of Europe.165 The document‟s section entitled Better Controls
on the Illegal Immigration mentions:
The European Council is convinced that effective action against
illegal immigration remains an essential counterpart to the
development of a common policy on legal immigration. The fight
against human trafficking in particular must remain a key priority
for this purpose. It will be important to ensure that the newly
adopted instruments in the area of return and sanctions against
employers, as well as the operation of readmission agreements, are
closely monitored in order to ensure their effective application.166
According to Carrera and Merlino, the Stockholm Program used the term “illegal”
throughout the body of the document, which ascribes undocumented immigrants
to criminal status.167 Moreover, the Stockholm Program focused on measures such
as return, readmission and criminalization of solidarity. The final document
omitted two recommendations by the European Commission‟s June 2009
Communication: 1) the common EU standards on non-removable illegal
immigrants and 2) the common guidelines for implementing regularization
programs.168 In other words, the outcome of the Stockholm Program would
contribute to the ongoing fight with illegal immigration through stricter border
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controls and better exchange of information on criminal and security issues
increased police co-operation.
The 2000s- Further Restrictive and Gradual Harmonization
With the millennium, new Europe entered into a more intensified
discourse about the future supranationalization of immigration policy. Restrictive
management of illegal immigrants and tightened external borders have topped
discussions among the member states and EU officials. Major treaty-amending
documents and official European Council meetings or proposals have clearly
projected two trends: the gradual, albeit stagnant, development of a “common”
immigration policy; and incrementally a more restrictive nature of the member
states and the EU institutions‟ approach to migration, supporting tight regulations
against an illegal population. Despite increased power of the pro-immigrant
European Commission, only those proposals restrictive in content managed to be
adopted.169 That said, most of the member states have not shared the European
Commission‟s liberal standpoint on immigration and thus lowered various
proposals during negotiations in the European Council of Ministers.170 Therefore,
directive proposals have undergone a most rigid change after the “9/11” in favor
of more security- and control-related nature of migration policies.171 As Petra
Bendel asserts, “communitarization of migration policies in the EU has, so far,
concentrated excessively on the control of migration and on the combating of
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irregular migration...”172 Matters of integration of migrants and attraction of
special groups of immigrants have been of secondary importance.
The 2000s opened more windows of opportunity for a comprehensive
approach to the immigration management at the EU level due to such events as
the “9/11,” the Madrid bombing in 2004, the Ceuta and Melilla incidents in 2005,
and the London bombings in 2005. These particular events indisputably put
immigration into the domain of security in Europe of the twenty-first century.173
The process of creating a common area of freedom, security and justice at the EU
level for all EU citizens has introduced distinction between “us” and “others.” In
the minds of many policymakers, therefore, securitization of immigration is
needed due to disharmony and chaos brought by migration.174
Albeit not discussed in the body of the chapter, the EU has introduced
several updates to it border control mechanism. The Visa Information System
(VIS) was adopted upon the (European) Council Decision from 2004
(2004/512/EC) in order to exchange visa data between member states which shall
enable national authorities to enter and update visa data and to consult these data
electronically.175 Moreover, the update of Schengen Information System (SIS) I to
Schengen Information System (SIS) II by the Regulation (EC) 1987/2006 in 2006
enhanced the goal to maintain “high level of security within the area of freedom,
security and justice of the European Union by supporting the implementation of
172
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policies linked to the movement of persons that are part of „the Schengen
acquis.‟”176 However, in June 2009, the European Council of Ministers formally
gave up SIS II due to its failures and replaced it by an enhanced version of SIS I
system.177
Further securitization of external border checks timely correlated with
incidents in Southern Europe. EU officials and the European states began to
pursue tougher border controls in the Mediterranean region, and linked the events
to Islamic terrorism.178 The twenty-first century has not only continued to label
immigrants as an economic threat, but also as a socio-cultural one. In addition, the
recent world economic downturn has caused even more selective resolution to
immigration policy at the national level of policymaking.
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Chapter 4: The Spanish Immigration Law and the Regularization
Programs
Following on the footsteps of the previous chapter, this section outlines
national immigration laws and legalization acts introduced by the Spanish
government in the period 1985-2010. First, I focus on legal documents, which are
divided into three time periods: the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. Similarly to
my chapter on the EU policy developments, I follow each subsection by a
summary of activities undertaken in each decade. My objective is to shed light on
Spain‟s alignment with EU objectives and the degree of influence that the EU has
exercised on the Spanish government since the mid-1980s.
Map 2 - Spain (with Ceuta and Melilla enclaves)

Source: University of Texas Libraries

Historically, Spain has been categorized as an emigration country. It
transitioned from a net emigration to a net immigration state in the 1980s. After
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General Francisco Franco‟s death in 1975, the economic boom fostered
unprecedented levels of expansion in the late 1980s and subsequently reduced
high levels of unemployment.179 The restoration of democracy in 1978 and
accession to the European Community in 1986 notably contributed to a steady
increase of legal and illegal immigration to Spain from less prosperous regions of
the world, mainly North Africa, the Americas and Asia. Other factors that
stimulated the growth of foreign population included the development of labor
markets within informal sectors,180 the geographical proximity with the Maghreb
countries, and lax immigration control mechanisms.181
Table 1- Foreign-born population in Spain – municipal registered (1985-2009)
Year
1985

Foreign-born
population
241,975*

1999

801,329*

2000

923,879

2001

1,370,657

2002

1,977,946

2003

2,664,168

2004

3,034,326

2005

3,730,610

2006

4,144,166
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2007

4,519,554

2008

5,268,762

2009

5,648,671

Sources: Francisco J. Duran Ruiz, “The Relationship between Legal Status, Rights and the Social
Integration of the Immigrants,” The Center for Comparative Immigration Studies (October 2003);
Instituto Nacional de Estatística [National Institute of Statistics]

In 2010, Spain was the eighth country in the world with the largest number
of international migrants as a raw number of people.182 The foreign-born
population residing in Spain increased almost twofold in a ten-year period: from
241,971 in 1985 to 499,773 in 1995 respectively.183 According to the Instituto
Nacional de Estatística [National Institute of Statistics], the number of foreignborn immigrants reached 923,879 in 2000184 and over 5.6 million in 2009,
increasing almost six-fold and making up more than 12 percent of the country‟s
population.185
As Soern Kern affirms in his article, the final figures representing
immigrants in Spain refer to inscribed individuals who register at the municipal
level. Regardless of their legal status, foreigners have an incentive to register
because, under the Spanish law, anyone who does so is entitled to emergency
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medical care.186 Therefore, one can register with the municipality and be
effectively an undocumented immigrant. According to the Ministerio de Trabajo e
Inmigración [Ministry of Labor and Immigration], only about 4.2 million out of
5.2 million inscribed immigrants in 2008 were legal residents. 187 Because illegal
foreigners continue to distrust the government, many of them avoid registration. It
is highly plausible that a number of undocumented immigrants is currently higher
than one million.
The 1980s – Top-Down Influence
Since the 1980s European countries have had their eyes on Spain
regarding immigration issues, and especially after the country‟s accession to the
European Community. Once this Southern European state joined the EC, it
automatically became known as Europe‟s “gateway” for non-EC nationals. The
Strait of Gibraltar‟s proximity to North Africa and the Canary Islands‟
geographical position were, and still are, portrayed as easy-access points for
thousands of immigrants. Moreover, as Lydia Esteve González and Richard Mac
Bride suggest, the second reason for the Community‟s worry about immigration
to Spain was the ability of Latin American and some other nationals to obtain
Spanish citizenship if they legally resided in Spain for a period of two years.188
Thus, as I illustrate below, its first immigration law fulfilled EC obligations,
whereas the first regularization measure compensated undocumented immigrants
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with working and/or living permit due to the restrictive nature of the initial legal
code.
LO 7/1985
Spain had no explicit immigration policy prior to 1985. There was no
legislation regarding the treatment of non-national residents.189 The Spanish
Constitution of 1978 contained only one reference to migration movements
embedded in Article 13, which specified the basic constitutional regulation of
immigrants. Rosa Aparicio Gómez and José María Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos
note that “the precept formulates a principle of restricted equivalence between
nationals and non-nationals vis-à-vis the entitlement to, and exercise of,
fundamental rights and public liberties.”190 The Spanish Constitution did not take
immigration into account because at the time of its creation, immigration was a
non-existing concern in Spain and the country was still an explorer of labor.
What revolutionized the legal aspect of migration was the first Spanish
immigration law, or Organic Law (Ley de Extranjería) 7/1985. The lawmakers
ignored the issue of integration of migrants and focused mainly on the control of
immigrants and external borders. The law made a clear and formal distinction
between legal and illegal immigrants. EC nationals gained all the rights to reside
and work in Spain, whereas non-EC nationals faced very limited privileges.191 For
the first time in Spanish history, a legal framework introduced visa requirements
for non-EC foreigners: those who intended to stay in Spain for longer than 90
189
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days needed to obtain residence and work permits.192 The law did not recognize
permanent permits and thus introduced a highly demanding set of requirements
for the renewal of temporary ones.193 This legal document, the first of its kind,
placed emphasis on deportation and introduced the possibility of expulsion of
illegal immigrants who did not have work permits and/or legal residence.194
Aparicio Gómez and Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos assess the law as “shortsighted” by the Spanish legislators who were in charge of outlining the legal
document.195 The law narrative consisted of only five pages in the Federal
Bulletin, leaving details to be worked out through administrative channels.196
Moreover, in-depth analysis of the law reveals the contingent inability of the
legislators to foresee the country‟s transformation from a net emigration to a net
immigration state. The unstable legal framework and insufficient resources for its
management impacted the migratory flow in subsequent years.197 Implementation
of the law did not halt an increasing number of illegal immigrants. Moreno
Fuentes asserts that LO 7/1985 was nothing more than placing Spain as a
gatekeeper of the EC southern border. The document‟s restrictiveness and focus
on border controls did not correspond with the migratory processes that were
affecting Spain at that time.198
The Regularization Program of 1986
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There are various reasons behind endeavoring to undertake a
regularization program. Some of them include reduction of the underground
economy; increase in tax and social security contributions; improvement of social
and economic situation of immigrants; and control over undocumented
population.199 Shortly afterwards, LO 7/1985 was followed by the first
regularization program of 1986. Its primary objective was to solve the issue of a
large number of undocumented immigrants living in Spain. It had little credibility
in the eyes of illegal immigrants.200 Allegedly, 38,100 applications were accepted.
Furthermore, during the implementation of this program, there was a large
number of detentions, expelling illegal immigrants, and leaving them without an
opportunity to obtain permits.201
The 1980s- External Pressure with Weak Domestic Interests
Although the 1980s symbolized Spain‟s unprecedented shift from an
emigration to an immigration country, the inflow of immigrants was portrayed as
a temporary phenomenon that filled in the bottom of occupational scale with
cheap labor from abroad. Therefore, the low salience of immigration in the
Spanish political agenda significantly contributed to “thoughtless acceptance of
European policy objectives within the legislation implemented at the national
level.”202 Many scholars writing on the history of the Spanish immigration law
development have persuasively asserted that the accession to the European
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Community pushed the Spanish government to pass its first immigration law203 in
order to comply with EC border controls and an overall concern with a swelling
number of immigrants in the Mediterranean region.
Table 2- Major illegal immigration-related policy steps in the 1980s
Timeline

The European
Community

Spain

National/international
overlapping events/trends
The Schengen Agreements- June

1985

LO 7/1985

1986

The first
regularization
Program

Spain‟s Accession to the European
Community

The Spanish
Presidency of
the European
Council of
Ministers –
January-June
1988

Spain - growing economy in the
late 1980s – need for unskilled,
cheap labor

19871989

The Single
European ActJuly 1987

As mentioned, the European Community outlined its demands for the
Spanish immigration law, which were not compatible with the realities of the
migratory processes in Spain. Consequently, external rather than internal
circumstances decisively impacted the content of the legal code. It is crucial to
keep in mind that the Schengen Agreements, which obscured the interests of its
signatory states,204 pursued external border controls and fought against illegal
immigration. Meantime, the EC signed a first treaty-amending document, the
Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, which underlined similar restrictive
measures. EC officials successfully maneuvered to transfer Schengen and the
203
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SEA objectives to the LO 7/1985 framework. Little understanding of the topic
and lack of experienced domestic staff specializing in migration encouraged
Europeanization of EC- defined restrictive policy direction.
The first regularization program of 1986 immediately succeeded LO
7/1985. As many have remarked, the legalization act came into effect due to
shortcomings of the latter law. Laura Huntoon writes that “a tightening of
immigration to Spain could decrease the supply of unskilled labor in Spain and
put a damper on economic growth if higher wages are needed to move Spaniards
into unskilled occupations.”205 Such an undesirable impact on the job market was
feared by those employers, who benefited from cheap labor in labor-intensive
sectors, including tourism, construction, agriculture and industry. The
regularization program was apparently an outcome of unfolding domestic
demands. Despite a high unemployment rate among native Spaniards, the growing
economy of the late 1980s generated jobs for unskilled workers, mainly filled by
illegal immigrants. Many argue that the first amnesty aimed at getting statistical
data on a number of foreigners living in Spain. As it turned out, the regularization
program fulfilled national needs of private and public sectors.
In summary, it is difficult to argue against the suggestion that LO 7/1985
was almost entirely influenced by EC demands. In fact, the 1986 regularization
program ran counter to the restrictive objectives of EC policies, because
according to empirical and statistical data, such programs have usually led to
further illegal migration. This statement challenges the strict nature of the Spanish
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immigration law and EC objectives, which at the same time began to pave a way
to the process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. Diana
Mata-Codesal adds that the regularization programs, seen as “exceptional”
measures, have been a way to bypass EC demands.206 Despite Spain‟s weak
stance on immigration issues and its passive transposition of EC objectives, its
government managed to address concerns related to illegal immigration at the
national level by introducing the regularization program and thus posing a
challenge to the EC framework.
The 1990s – Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences
In the early 1990s, Spain recognized that immigration was not a temporary
concern, as foreign visitors often chose the country as their permanent destination.
Admitting that LO 7/1985 fell short of what a comprehensive immigration law
should have looked like, implementation of visa requirements, two regularization
programs, transposition of a few EU directives, and external border surveillance
programs furthered the development of the Spanish immigration regime. As
immigration became an increasingly discussed topic, many policymakers
anticipated a new law in order to address the changing reality. By the end of the
decade, the Spanish parliament began debating a bill that would revise the former
immigration law through advocating integration as a way of incorporating
immigrants into the Spanish society.207
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The 1991 Visa Requirements
The so-called update to LO 7/1985 took place in May 1991, when the
Spanish government imposed visa requirements for the first time on entrants from
Morocco, Algiers, and Tunisia.208 Subsequently, in 1993, visitors from the
Dominican Republic were also asked to obtain visas. At that time, these countries
were recognized as sources of a large number of undocumented immigrants in
Spain.209 The visa policy coincided with the expiration of agreements with
Morocco and Tunisia for mutual elimination of the required documents.
Beforehand, Spanish authorities maintained a lax stand on the implementation of
border control policies, already targeted by LO 7/1985. Again, the European
Community became an influential player in the formation of immigration policies.
Because Spain looked forward to joining the Schengen Agreements in June 1992,
one of its preconditions included the tightening of borders with the Maghreb
countries.210 Consequently, the change in the visa policy led to reinforcement of
borders around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco.
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Map 3- Ceuta and Melilla

Source: Maps of Net

The Regularization Programs of 1991 and 1996
Shortly after, Spain implemented its second relevant act in June 1991, by
granting three-year work and residence permits to 118,321 undocumented
foreigners. This particular document targeted foreign workers who “were already
in the country by May 15, 1991 and had an ongoing work contracts, or were selfemployed in legitimate enterprise, or had previously had a valid residence and
work permit.”211 It is noteworthy that this measure was a product of domestic
politics, which resulted in a pressure from pro-immigration groups for a broad
amnesty.212 Another rationale behind this second legalization was
overwhelmingly based on the visa policy. Over 40 percent of applicants were
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Moroccans. This political leeway demonstrated that the document came from the
domain of foreign policy toward Morocco.213
As a brief interface, it is important to mention again that the European
Community transformed into the European Union in 1993. The creation of the
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), with its new competencies, remained a hybrid of
intergovernmentalist and supranationalist pillars. Initially, the JHA was
envisioned as substantially intergovernmental, allowing for any future
communitarization of its activities. As early as in the first half of the 1990s, the
Spanish parliament and the government articulated the need to join Schengen and
to become an active player in migration politics at the EU level as a way to
participate in the future communitarization of immigration policies.214
Following the second regularization process, another significant
legalization act closely connected to the Regulations for Foreigners (the Royal
Decree 155/1996), was introduced in 1996. According to Cornelius, this measure
was a response to the February 1996 change in the rules concerning work permits,
by extending their duration.215 It legalized over 21,300 out of 25,128 applicants
by issuing five-year residence permits.216 It aimed at granting permits to those
immigrants who lost them due to the restrictive character of the preceding acts.
The Royal Decree 155/1996 took one of the most significant steps toward the
permanent status of immigrants.217 A foreigner who could prove that he had lived
legally in Spain for six consecutive years, by renewing his temporary permits,
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could apply for permanent residence status. This document advocated extended
rights to foreigners and moved the Spanish immigration policies toward a more
liberal approach, focusing on integration and immigrant rights. Thanks to the
Royal Decree 155/1996, a parliamentary commission debated a new immigration
law in 1998 that would substitute LO 7/1985 and contextualize the liberal spirit of
the mid-1990s.
The Integrated System of Exterior Vigilance (SIVE) - 1999
In January 1998 a chief executive officer of the Spanish national police
(from the Partido Popular) introduced implementation of an enforcement project
called “Plan Sur.” The project aimed at “strengthening of border controls, a more
intensive surveillance of air- and seaports, a tightening of deportation procedures
and a closer cooperation with Moroccan and Algerian authorities.”218 It
invigorated a harsher stance on unlawful entrances of immigrants from North
Africa. The following year, the Integrated System of Exterior Vigilance (SIVE)
was approved as a mean to control the maritime border more efficiently. SIVE
was launched with a budget of about € 150 million for the period 1999-2004. The
funding supported maritime surveillance operations at a distance of 10 to 25
kilometers from shore.219 At first, the only region under surveillance was the
Strait of Gibraltar, which is the southernmost coastline of Spain. It was
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subsequently extended to the east and west of the Spanish mainland. Today it
covers the entire Andalusian coast and some parts of Canary Islands‟ coasts.220
Map 4- Coastlines covered by SIVE

Source: Jørgen Carling, “The Merits and Limitations of Spain's High-Tech Border
Control,” Migration Information Source (June 2007).

Moreover, the system has succeeded in slowing down the rate of increase of the
number of boats in the controlled regions. According to Jørgen Carling, the total
number of unauthorized migrants intercepted along the coasts of mainland Spain
in the 1990s reached 17,000 in 2000. From 2002 to 2004, the number dropped to
9,000 -10,000 interceptions per year. Moreover, the number was less than 5,000
in 2005, and then jumped to 31,000 in 2006.221 However, it did not stop
immigrants from finding other ways of entering Spain. Critics of such a
controversial system have voiced their concerns that immigrants have nonetheless
found other routes to enter the coastal lines. Also, fatality figures have increased
220
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since the installation of SIVE. Regardless of its unfulfilled promise to stop
unauthorized immigration, its establishment pronounced a new position of the
country in the European Union as an active proponent of the fight against
inflowing undocumented immigrants and as a supporter of bilateral negotiations
with the sending countries.
The 1990s - Prevailing Mixture of European and Domestic Demands
The early 1990s pronounced the ongoing Community and unfolding
domestic pressure, which favored integration-oriented policymaking and stricter
external border controls. The visa requirements were triggered by two factors:
direct EC/EU influence and the Europe-wide economic downturn in the early
1990s. In the interim, the Schengen Agreements relied on strictly
intergovernmental cooperation framework; they emphasized interests of the
signatory countries that found fulfillment in Spain‟s external border controls and
visa policies. Namely, the EU had resolutely managed to promote Schengen
objectives.
Table 3– Major illegal immigration-related steps in the 1990s
Timeline

The European
Union

Spain

1990
1991

National/international
overlapping events/trends
Fall of Communism

Visa
requirements
(Tunisia,
Morocco,
Algiers) - May
The second
Regularization
program – June
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Schengen II
Europe-wide economic recession
of the early 1990s

1992

Spain signs the Schengen
Agreements in June

1993

The Treaty of
European Union
(Maastricht
Treaty) –
November
1994-1995 The Barcelona
Conference –
November 1995

1996

1997-1999

The Treaty of
Amsterdam –
May 1999

Visa
requirements –
(the Dominican
Republic)
The Spanish
Presidency of
the European
Council of
Ministers (JulyDecember 1995)
The Royal
Decree
155/1996
The third
regularization
program
“Plan Sur”
SIVE

The Tampere
Summit –
October 1999
Approval of “Plan Sur” and SIVE by the conservative government is a
success story. The surveillance system not only aimed at tightening the Spanish
maritime border, but also at fulfilling obligations vis-à-vis Europe.222 Albeit a
national innovative system, SIVE has emphasized Spain‟s concern with the
impact of the inflow of African immigrants to the European Union. Fauser
pinpoints that the Spanish government had articulated the need to become a
member of Schengen as a way to participate in the communitarization of
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immigration policies.223 Visa requirements, “Plan Sur” and SIVE, could be
described as official initiatives of support for the EU-wide policy. As I already
remarked, Spain voiced its support for a “common” immigration policy as early
as two decades ago, but only recently (in the late 1990s onward) turned „theory‟
into „practice‟.
Spain's compliance with EU policies was noticeable in the country's
adaptation of many EU rules throughout the 1990s. Nonetheless, the two
regularization programs and the 1998 parliamentary talks about a more liberal
approach undermined the Partido Popular‟s enactment of “Plan Sur” and SIVE.
Furthermore, such measures derailed from the EU vision of an overly restrictive
“common” immigration policy that would, first and foremost, fight against illegal
immigration and would favor social exclusion of illegal immigrants.
Esteve González and Mac Bride assert that the 1990s witnessed an overall
attempt by the EU member states to reduce the rights of foreigners. Only such
countries Italy, France and Spain intuitively aimed at extending such privileges.224
In the early 1990s, the Spanish government under former Prime Minister Felipe
González kept a low-profile immigration policy by avoiding public uprisings and
inflated expectations.225 Throughout years, the socialist government reflected
support for less radical stance on immigration and more pro-integration policies.
The urgency to solve issues concerning undocumented immigrants
appeared to have been a powerful incentive to introduce further reforms at the
national level. The 1991 and 1996 liberal regularization programs antagonized
223

Fauser, “Selective Europeanization,” 140.
González and Mac Bride, “Fortress Europe,”168.
225
Cornelius, “Spain: The Uneasy Transition,” 391.
224

84

certain European leaders. However, according to national supporters of
legalization acts, their introduction was necessary at times because such programs
fulfill certain demands of the public and private sectors which cannot be met by
the EU.
The 2000s – More Pronounced Bottom-Up Influence
The formation of national preferences has become more pronounced since
the 2000s. The decade introduced new challenges, which have been defining the
immigration policy framework at both the EU and national levels in restrictive
terms. The mid-2000s economic boom attracted cheap labor from abroad, which
rapidly increased the size of foreign population living in Spain. The 2000s
initiated a more restrictive approach to illegal immigration. The first amendment
to LO 7/1985 embodied a paradox. Subsequently, its further reforms, LO 8/2000,
LO 14/2003 and LO 2/2009, focused on a more ferocious approach to illegal
migration, tighter border controls, repatriation of illegal immigrants, and
cooperation with third world countries in order to control the inflow of
undocumented foreigners. Again, three Spanish regularization programs served as
countermeasures to the restrictiveness of EU objectives.
LO 4/2000
Despite the recent securitization of immigration issues, LO 4/2000
introduced “the most liberal law on the rights of foreigners in Europe.”226 It
formalized the long-envisioned goal to effectively integrate immigrants. The
law‟s objectives stemmed from the Royal Decree 155/1996, which initiated
reforms of LO 7/1985. The document was an important landmark in the
226
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construction of the liberal immigration legislation in Spain. It is crucial to note
that both the Royal Decree and LO 4/2000 were advocated by the Partido
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), a left-wing political party. In the months
leading up to the approval of the new immigration law, the Spanish parliament
hosted impassioned debates between socialists and conservatives. The right-wing
political party, the Partido Popular (PP), introduced 112 amendments for the bill
of 77 articles.227 The group affirmed that the proposals were too liberal and did
not follow restrictive EU objectives, mainly outlined in the spirit of the Tampere
Summit of 1999. However, due to the lack of an absolute majority in the
parliament, the PP failed to implement its revisions.
While the harmonization of immigration laws at the EU level was based
on the laws of most restrictive countries, the socialist government in power, due
to its integration-friendly approach to foreigners,228 carried out reforms to deliver
more rights to foreigners. LO 4/2000 extended certain privileges to illegal
immigrants that were once reserved for legal residents only. This phenomenon
meant that all immigrants, regardless of their legal status, who registered in the
municipal census, gained the following rights: freedom to demonstrate, strike, and
participate in associations; right to education; access to emergency and regular
public health care; right to housing assistance and basic services.229 Additionally,
undocumented residence and work did not constitute substantial reasons for
227
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expulsion from Spanish territory.230 I can state it differently and assert that the
new law excluded deportation of undocumented migrants.
LO 8/2000
The premature death of LO 4/2000 occurred after the Partido Popular‟s
electoral victory in March 2000. The conservative party, dissatisfied with the new
law, revised it with LO 8/2000 before the end of the year. To many this
transformation introduced a restrictive period of immigration. LO 8/2000 outlined
several alternations to the previous legal framework. It continued to encourage
measures that favored integration, but only concerning immigrants who had a
legal status. The PP denied illegal immigrants the right to association,
demonstration and strikes. Full access to education remained mainly unaltered,
with one exception: non-obligatory education would only by guaranteed for
resident immigrants. Moreover, the right to public health care also stayed
unchanged. Unlike the grounds provided by LO 4/2000, illegal residence and
work constituted sufficient reasons for expulsion.231 LO 8/2000 reintroduced
deportation as an effective tool to deal with undocumented immigrants. Calavita
notes that the law was designed to “bring Spain into compliance with the EU
agreement at Tampere in 1999 and the Schengen Agreements, which the PP
claimed had been violated by the permissiveness of the LO 4/2000.”232 Meantime,
the conservative government also approved a plan for integrating foreign
immigrants called the Global Program of Regulation and Coordination of
Immigration in Spain (GRECO), which was active throughout the period of 2000230
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2004. Even though this plan emphasized the integration of immigrants as a
fundamental element of a “healthy” immigration policy, it nonetheless aligned
with the restrictive approach of LO 8/2000.233 It limited integration services to
immigrants who were paying social security and income taxes.234 The plan clearly
favored rhetoric of expulsion of illegal immigrants and reinforcement of external
border controls.
The Regularization Program of 2000
The catalyst of the 2000 regularization program was restrictiveness of LO
8/2000. It opened doors to deportations en masse. This particular spike in
expulsions fueled widespread protests by pro-immigration groups.235 The
extraordinary measure granted work and residence permits to 163,913 out of
247,598 applicants, a much higher number than the preceding programs.236
Legalized immigrants received one-year temporary residence/work permits. One
of the many conditions included proof of residency in Spain since June 1, 1999.237
Again, despite the reticent attitude of EU officials towards national legalization
acts, Spanish policymakers continued to perceive regularization as a way to
answer domestic demands, including the fight against marginalization,
exploitation of undocumented immigrants, and demand for unskilled labor.238 As
Calavita shows, integration policies in Spain have not been very effective and the
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immigrant‟s marginality is structured into the society. Thus, any political move
toward extending immigrant rights, such as regularization programs, has been
aimed at reducing the codified “otherness” of foreigners.239
The Regularization Program of 2001
Following LO 8/2000, the Partido Popular introduced an additional
regularization program in 2001, mainly due to continuous protests on the streets
and in the Spanish Parliament.240 Qualifying applicants had to prove presence in
Spain before January 23, 2001. The legalization process granted one-year
temporary residence permits to about 243,790 out of 361,289 undocumented
immigrants.241 After the 2001 regularization program, the right-wing government
announced that it would not offer any other legalization acts in order to avoid the
“call effect,”242 which was interpreted as a magnet for more undocumented
immigration.
LO 14/2003
Despite the 2001 amnesty, the Partido Popular continued to make illegal
immigration a top priority. An increasing number of migrants, instances of human
trafficking, and smuggling networks had invigorated the party‟s reformative
sentiment. To the bewilderment of many, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español
signed the new law. LO 14/2003 did not change the hostility exhibited by the
conservative government toward illegal foreigners. Some of the law‟s goals
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included the efficient expulsion of illegal residents, entry controls at airports,
limited rights for the families of immigrants and inability to regularize status in
case of continuous illegal permanence in the country.243 Controversially, the
document allowed the police to access information on foreign residents who
registered in the municipal census. Such an extreme revision discouraged many
immigrants from participating in the census, jeopardizing their access to health
care and social benefits.244 LO 14/2003 continued to target illegal immigration
and exercise external border controls; its objectives correlated with a European
view of a “fortress Europe.”
The Regularization Program of 2005
Following the terrorist bombings of Madrid mass transit, and the
mishandling of that crisis by the conservative government, the 2004 general
elections welcomed the Partido Socialista Obrero Español as the victorious
political party. Although the socialist party did not push for a reform of the recent
immigration law, it introduced another regularization program in 2005. The party
in power decided to align with the needs of national employers.245 The recent
regularization act differed slightly from the preceding ones. Employers had to
submit an application on behalf of undocumented workers. Once approved, a
worker would get a one-year residence and work authorization permit that would

243

Cristina Fernández Bessa and José María Ortuño Aix, “Spanish Immigration Policies and
Legislative Evolution in that Field as a New Exceptional Framework,” Liberty and Security,
working paper 9 (May 2006), http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/WP9The_reforms_of_the_Immigration_.pdf (accessed February 20, 2009).
244
Carlota Solé, “Immigration Policies in Southern Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 30, no. 6 (November 2004): 1219.
245
It is noteworthy that Spain, at that time, continued to experience an economic boom.

90

be renewed for up to two years.246 Another main requirement stated that the
applicant had to have lived in Spain as of August 2004. Similarly to the previous
programs, immigrants needed to register in the municipal census. Also, as Table 4
shows, the 2005 regularization process constituted the largest one so far.
Table 4– Extraordinary regularization programs, 1986-2005
Year

Number of
applicants

Percentage of
applications
granted

-

Number of
regularized
immigrants
38,100

1986
1991

110,100

108,321

98.4%

1996

25,128

21,300

84.8%

2000

247,598

163,913

66.2%

2001

361,289

243,790

67.5%

2005

691,655

575,827

83.1%

Source: Ministerio del Interior [Ministry of the Interior]; Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración
[Ministry of Labour and Immigration]. Reproduced from Aparicio Gómez & Ruiz de Huidobro de
Carlos, “Report from Spain.”

The regularization program did not avoid domestic and international
criticism. Despite the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and growing public
discontent with a large number of immigrants, the socialist government went
ahead and introduced this measure. The Partido Popular continued to emphasize
on the “call effect.” International criticism came mainly from other member states
and EU officials. Although the most recent legalization act was considered a
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positive step by the Council of Europe and the United Nations, it was criticized by
Brussels officials, as well as by Germany and France.247 Because of the
movement facilities afforded by the Schengen Agreements, they foresaw
regularization as a magnet for illegal immigrants not only to Spain, but also to
other states.248 The fact that Spain did not consult with other EU countries prior to
implementing the new regulation shocked many observers and EU policymakers.
Even though there has not been a unified position on implementing regularization
programs, attitudes towards such acts have varied from country to country,249
which can largely be described as opposition and skepticism.
LO 2/2009
As Spain experienced a shift from an economic boom to an economic bust
in 2007-2008, the persistent inflow of immigrants pressured the socialist
government to consider an immigration reform, which would align with socioeconomic challenges facing the country. The Partido Socialista Obrero Español
introduced a new, more restrictive law. LO 2/2009 came into force in December
2009. The document incorporated all EU directives, which were introduced since
LO 4/2000 came into force. According to LO 2/2009, these directives were
reflected in the Spanish legal system.250 The amending document increased a
period for detaining illegal migrants from 40 to 60 days before deporting them
back to their home countries. Taking into consideration the Directive 2009/52
247
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regarding sanctions applicable to employers of illegal immigrants, employers of
undocumented workers or individuals encouraging illegal migration would be
fined up to €10,000, whereas human trafficking would be fined up to €100,000.251
The 2000s- Politicization of Immigration, Selective EU’s Influence and Spain’s
Impact on the “Common” Immigration Policy Rhetoric
Indisputably, socio-economic and political events influenced the
development of more restrictive policies. The recent decade finally formed welldefined domestic interests with respect to illegal immigration and external border
controls. Out of the steps of the immigration law development covered thus far,
the short-lived LO 4/2000 was the only anomaly. Immigrant integration proved to
be a priority for the socialist government in its effort to meet the interests of
lobbying groups (NGOs, employer organizations, trade unions, churches, etc.)
who benefited from the incorporation of foreigners into mainstream society. All
further law amending documents had been more conservative due to the presence
of acute socio-economic problems.
Table 5 – Major illegal immigration-related steps in the 2000s
Timeline
2000

The European
Union

Spain
LO 4/2000

National/international
overlapping events/trends
El Ejido incident- February

The fourth
regularization
program
LO 8/2000
The Global
Program of
Regulation and
251
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2001

2002

Directive
(D/2001/40)

The Seville
Summit – June
Directive
(D/2002/90)

2003

Coordination of
Immigration in
Spain (GRECO)
Visa
requirements
(Cuba, Peru)

The “9/11” bombings
Beginning of the war in
Afghanistan- October

The fifth
regularization
program
Visa
requirements
(Colombia)
The Spanish
Presidency of
the European
Council of
Ministers –
(January-June)
Visa
requirements
(Ecuador)

The war in Iraq begins– March

LO 14/2003
2004

The Hague
Program (20042009)

The Madrid bombings

Directive (D
2004/82)

The establishment
of FRONTEX

2005

The sixth
regularization
program

2006
2007

Visa
requirements
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The London bombings
The Ceuta and Melilla
incidents

2008

2009

2010

Directive
(D/2008/115)

(Bolivia)
Slowdown of
the housing
industry

The European
Pact on
Immigration and
Asylum – October
The Lisbon Treaty
– December;
Directive
(D/2009/52)

The worldwide economic
crisis begins

Economic/financial downturn

LO 2/2009

Economic/financial downturn

Decisively, recent circumstances and events have influenced the public
opinion and the government‟s stance on illegal immigration. Shortly after the
introduction of LO 4/2000, violent riots broke out in El Ejido. This unfortunate
event not only ignited anti-immigrant revolts, but also placed immigration on the
socio-political agenda. As the general election approached, the Partido Popular
politicized the event for its electoral value.252 The conservative government
capitalized on the public‟s discontent with immigration and linked it to the
upcoming elections and legislation. This publicized tragedy benefited the rightwing, which found solid ground to further restrict the immigration law.253
El Ejido represented a domestic issue that influenced the outcome of the
immigration reform. Yet another factor that gave a green light to implement LO
8/2000 was the Tampere Summit. The latter official meeting of EU heads of state
and government emphasized the need to develop a “common” immigration
policy, which would strengthen border controls and expel illegal immigrants.
252
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Former Prime Minister Aznar took advantage of the flexibility of European
guidelines, which left room for interpretations, and of the so-called “escape to
Europe” in order to justify his actions. This instance represented the Spanish
government‟s nature of selectiveness of EU objectives. The Tampere Summit
document introduced a non-binding list of objectives that was used (due to
domestic interests) as a legitimate excuse. Zapata-Barrero mentions that the PP
abused the argument that the Tampere Summit “forced Spain to become more
restrictive (something which was obviously false but that public opinion believed
without any counter-argumentation by other actors).”254 As Fauser asserts, “it
[Tampere] gave a reason to act for a new bill and thereby to introduce the issue in
the election campaign.”255 The PP combined European demands with its domestic
interests in combat against illegal migration.256
Despite Spain‟s visible selection among EU objectives, the supranational
institutions continued to sporadically influence the Spanish government. Several
Council directives257 in the area of immigration policies, such as recognition of
decisions on expulsion among the member countries (D 2001/40) and a common
definition on facilitating unauthorized entry, stay and residence (2002/90) were
approved in the EU and then transposed within the Spanish legal code, as
observed in the text of LO 14/2003.258 Recently, the Spanish government
supported the so-called Return Directive (D 2008/115) of 2008, standardizing the
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conditions for expelling illegal immigrants throughout Europe.259 The Directive
on employers‟ sanctions (D 2009/52) has prohibited the employment of illegal
third-country nationals in order to combat illegal immigration. Nonetheless, “it
lays down minimum common standards on sanctions and measures to be applied
in the Member States against employers who infringe that prohibition.”260
The 2001 Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 introduced lists of “the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing external
borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement.”261 Because
EU regulations are law-binding documents, Spain applied visa requirements to
Latin American countries: Cuba and Peru in 2001, Colombia in 2002, Ecuador in
2003, 262 and Bolivia in 2007,263 just as outlined in the official document.
The Spanish Presidency of European Council of Ministers in 2002 (and
also its Presidency in 2010) outlined the country‟s intention to place immigration
issues at the top of the EU agenda.264 The Presidency was used as a platform to
coordinate the member states on issues related to this Spanish dilemma.265 The
Seville Summit in 2002 allowed the government to outline such objectives as
illegal immigration, human trafficking, immigrant-related criminality and external
border controls. Its conclusions were seen as a mere continuation of the Tampere
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objectives. As Fauser asserts, “this course for further development of restriction
and control on migration in the EU was reflected in the Spanish initiative for a
directive on the communication of passenger data by carriers.”266 The Spanish
proposal was turned into a directive (D 2004/82) at the end of April 2004. The
Directive aimed at harmonizing carriers‟ financial penalties provided for by the
member states.
Furthermore, the establishment of FRONTEX in 2004 has its roots in
Spanish advocacy. The central government has actively promoted FRONTEX by
voicing the need for more resources and commitment from the EU member states.
After unfortunate events in Ceuta and Melilla, Spain sought a European response
to the crisis and encouraged measures to deal with sending countries. The Global
Approach, approved by the European Council of December 2005, had a clear
Spanish stamp on it, too. Its three premises were: “solidarity among member
states, partnership with third countries and protection of emigrants, especially the
most vulnerable groups.”267 Spain pursued an agenda of measures, policies and
instruments, already included in the Tampere Summit and the Hague Program, in
order to advance the construction of a “common” immigration policy.268
Moreover, since 2006, Spain‟s multiple agreements with African sending
countries have placed emphasis on the external dimension of a “common”
immigration policy.
The convergence of Spanish-EU policies has been widely accredited to the
Partido Popular as a major player in negotiating agreements. As Johansson266
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Nogués writes, “the very success of the PP‟s strategy is well illustrated by the fact
that immigration now occupies a fairly central place on the European agenda as a
security concern.”269 The recent years have also shown the socialist government‟s
harsher stance on illegal immigration. Recent LO 2/2009 continues the restrictive
pathway of the Spanish immigration stance. It was implemented shortly after the
Lisbon Treaty, which brought in hope for a long-envisioned “common”
immigration policy. The recent national immigration law converged with EU
objectives. In other words, a “common” immigration policy might resemble the
Spanish law in many of its aspects, considering the fact that the Spanish
government has lately played a considerable role in outlining migration
cooperation at the EU level.
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Chapter 5: Applicability of Theoretical Frameworks
In this chapter, I begin with definitions of the birth and the process of the
“common” immigration policy development within the lines of neofunctionalism
and supranationalism. On the one hand, the neofunctionalist “spillover”
mechanism, from economic integration to political integration, may help to
explain the initiation of the interstate cooperation in the mid-1980s. On the other
hand, supranationalism may help to understand the incremental delegation of the
member states‟ sovereign control over illegal immigration and border controls to
the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of
Justice. Furthermore, I introduce an intergovernmentalist critique of both theories.
Ultimately, I test the relevance of liberal intergovernmentalism in the case study
of Spain, by applying Moravcsik‟s three-tier mechanism of EU negotiations. I
examine Spain‟s impact on EU initiatives through national preference formation,
interstate bargaining and institutional choice.
Applicability of Neofunctionalism- Rationale behind Initiation of a
“Common” Immigration Policy
Many European integration students and experts persuasively suggest that
the European immigration regime, which emerged in the mid-1980s, was a child
of neofunctionalism. Many of them, including Mutimer, Neimann and Schmitter,
claim that the Single European Act‟s commitments to the abolition of internal
borders and the free movement of EC citizens compelled the member states to
subsequently coordinate their national migration policies, 270 which they have
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done only to a degree. By failing to harmonize immigration policies, the states
would have jeopardized the EC developments in the economic sphere. Thus, in
the neofunctionalist scenario, the states jumped on the bandwagon in the fear that
abstaining from a future “common” immigration policy would negatively
influence the Single Market.271 Leticia Delgado Godoy asserts that “the objective
of creating a unified market favored the consideration of immigration as a
question that should be tackled at a European level.”272 Moreover, Brochmann
adds that “the enhanced freedom of movement within the Single Market has
stimulated a tendency towards greater cooperation and coordination between EU
member countries in this [immigration] field.”273
Another scholar, Lu, argues that the member states‟ decision to cooperate
on external border controls and migration policies followed from functional
“spillover,” which started with the call for free movement of labor,274 but was
finalized with the internal market proposals. Lu further supports “spillover” by
defining Articles 8A, 8B, and 100C of the Treaty of the European Union as
representing “spillover” of problems from economic integration to visa policy and
citizenship and then to the issue of migration.275 Alan Butt Philip also recognizes
supplementary instances of neofunctionalist “spillover.” A slow and reluctant
association of the EU institutions with more and more immigration issues (visa
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policy, illegal migration policy, etc.) has revealed instances of political and
cultivated “spillovers.”276
From a neofunctionalist point of view then, the determinants behind the
harmonization of these policies included a need to maximize success and benefits
of removed internal borders and the freedom of movement.277 Therefore, this
observation has led many scholars to argue that functional “spillover” has been
the root cause of further integration of immigration policies. To recall, functional
“spillover” refers to a situation in which harmonization in one segment of
policymaking spills over to cooperate activities in other sectors, which are closely
linked to the former integrated sector.278 The initial plan to demolish internal
borders and apply the free movement of persons (SEA) coordinated one segment
of policymaking at the EC level and spilled over to the immigration policy sector.
Anthony Messina and Colleen Thouez present three independent
arguments picturing the linkage between the completion of the Single Market and
the initiation of the immigration policy harmonization.279 The first argument is
that “the failure to harmonize national policies on non-EU immigration threatened
to diminish the overall economic returns of the Single Market, as nationals of
some member states were disadvantaged in seeking employment in the labor
markets of other member states who pursue relatively permissive policies toward
less costly non-EU labor.”280 Differing immigration policies in the Single Market
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would be against economic rationality. Another argument says that nonharmonized immigration policies threatened to distort trade competition within
the internal market, where the member states with liberal immigration policies
gained a competitive economic edge over the member states with more restrictive
policies.281 The last argument assumes that the abolition of internal borders and
lack of cooperation to harmonize national immigration policies would endanger
adequacy of the member states to protect them against international terrorism and
drug trafficking.282 Neofunctionalists take such arguments into consideration by
asserting that absence of internal borders expanded “spillover” process into the
immigration sphere.
Moreover, “spillover” from the Single Market into the “common”
immigration policy rhetoric initiated years of the cooperative development of a
harmonized approach to immigration. Neofunctionalists would argue that the
above-described official documents have shown clear empirical evidence of
functional “spillover” in a process. The latter type of “spillover” has gained
credibility in additional instances of political and cultivated “spillovers.”
Particularly, the theory of supranationalism accredits the phenomenon of the two
latter “spillovers.”
With respect to functional “spillover,” once the member states understood
the costs of national immigration policies, they began to push for harmonized
policies, targeting external border controls and restrictive legislations against
illegal migrants. The EU heads of state and government have incrementally and
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voluntarily upgraded control over these issues to the supranational level. Backed
by selected data from the 1980s, neofunctionalists found rationale behind the
puzzling question of why the member states began to harmonize their
immigration policies.
Applicability of Supranationalism- Empowerment of the EU Institutions by
the EC/EU Treaties
Supranationalism has built its arguments on the neofunctionalist
framework, mainly because neofunctionalism has endorsed supranational
governance and has served as the basis theory for supranationalism. Once
functional “spillover” affected integration of immigration policies, further
developments in the field had enshrined more power to the EC/EU institutions
with respect to policymaking at the EU level.
As argued by some, the Single European Act induced a neofunctionalist
behavior, which was halted in the 1960s and the 1970s by unfavorable
constituents. Again, neofunctionalists see the SEA as an engine of harmonization.
Subsequently after neofunctionalism, supranationalism took the lead role in
defining the evolution of a “common” immigration policy. Messina and Thouez
mention that when an interstate cooperation grows, the member states engage in
common strategies and plans to solve mutual problems.283 In the case of
immigration policies, one can argue that a failure to control the augmenting
inflow of illegal immigrants and “porous” external borders has accredited the
supranationalist approach, where technocratic EU authorities would,
independently of the member states‟ interference, resolve domestic problems of
283
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the nation states. Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill would agree with the
latter statement. They assert that the supranational institutions have in fact helped
to correct national efficiency failings and have served as supplementary aid to the
member states.284 National control over asylum and migration policies has
presented challenges where the EU could offer effective arena for problem
solving.285
The Single European Act introduced only minimized supranationalization
in the sphere of migration policies. The White Paper‟s proposals, dealing with the
free movement of people, fell under the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice‟s competencies. However, the approval of an extended control
over illegal immigration was still a subject to unanimity, where any EC head of
state and government could veto a proposal. Some of the member states‟
disagreement with the European Commission‟s liberal Guidelines for a
Community Policy on Migration revealed persisting reluctance to cede
sovereignty over such sensitive areas. The EC member states preferred
intergovernmental cooperation outside of the SEA framework, undermining the
European Commission‟s enduring goal of a common approach at that time.
Therefore it would be futile to attribute any meaningful supranational
achievements to the SEA. Nonetheless, increased attention to the immigration
field, presumably caused by functional “spillover,” paved a way to the
harmonization of national policies.
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Unlike the SEA, the Treaty of the European Union formalized the
development of a “common” immigration policy. The European Commission, the
European Parliament and the European Court of Justice continued to exercise
marginal role in decision making, while the European Council of Ministers
emerged as a dominant actor, yet still with unanimous decision-making
mechanism. The European Commission‟s powers were also constrained.286
Nonetheless, comparing to the pre-Maastricht period of no initiative power of the
European Commission, the TEU awarded the institution with shared initiative
under the third pillar (the Justice and Home Affairs).287 The European Parliament
continued to be an institution informed about discussions and sporadically asked
for recommendations.288 Although the European Parliament‟s role did not change
from consultation to co-decision, Brochmann notes that the institution has
nonetheless become more active in the migration realm since the Treaty.289 The
European Commission‟s weak authoritative structure was also compensated with
increasing level of activity in the immigration policy regime,290 mainly in inbetween treaties‟ periods.
To sum up, the legal basis for the harmonization of immigration issues
introduced by the Treaty of the European Union continued to be weak; it did not
involve any binding regulations or directives presented in the text. Three „soft‟
policy instruments, characteristic for the third pillar, were available for the
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member states. They included joint positions, which had no binding power; joint
actions, which depended on unanimity; and conventions, which required
ratification at the national level.291
Achievements of the Treaty of Amsterdam more noticeably fueled the
“common” immigration policy development. The transfer of the JHA from the
third to the first pillar formalized collective commitment to a potential, “common”
immigration policy. The JHA pillar shift maintained unanimity in the European
Council of Ministers as the basis of decision making for at least five years.
Gebbes comments that “the member states imported the comfort blanket of
intergovernmentalism and constrained the scope for supranational
institutionalization.”292 Referring to the European Parliament, the Treaty of
Amsterdam gave it more expansive privileges. The institution gained a
consultative power for the first five years after the document; after this time
period, co-decision would follow. Similarly, the European Commission would
increase its powers in 2004. It would gain a sole right to initiate legislations in the
immigration realm. However, until then, the latter EU institution would share the
legislative power with the European Council of Ministers.293 The European Court
of Justice would have “the jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of Title III A
on a request from the Council of Ministers, Commission, or a member state.”294
The Treaty of Nice harmonized Title IV by introducing qualified majority
voting (QMV) in most decisions in the area of visa, asylum, and immigration.
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According to The Treaty of Nice and Seville Declarations 2002 White Paper,
more favorable Community procedures would apply. The right to initiate would
rest with the European Commission, while the European Council of Ministers
would take a decision to move to QMV and co-decision with the European
Parliament.295 It is important to state that qualified majority voting aimed at
coming into force (if agreed by the European Council of Ministers) five years
after the Treaty of Nice‟s implementation (2009). According to the previously
mentioned document, the member states would unanimously decide, as of May 1,
2004, whether to extend qualified majority voting and co-decision to such
sensitive measures as illegal immigration and the freedom of movement of third
country nationals within the European Union.296 As of today, QMV, promised by
the Treaty of Nice in certain immigration areas, has not yet been implemented.
Nonetheless, institutionalists have noticed significant achievements reflected in
the Treaty of Nice, with respect to the illegal immigration area.
Some say that the recent Treaty of Lisbon moved forward the over twodecade-long process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. The
Treaty clearly referred to an ultimately legally-binding “common” immigration
policy. The document outlined a potential transfer of decision making in the
migration sphere to qualified majority voting in the European Council of
Ministers and to co-decision in the European Parliament. The Treaty concretized
the “common” immigration policy rhetoric applied by the European Union and
295
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shared by the member states. Additionally, it replaced the three pillars with a
single legal framework. The planned substitution of unanimity with qualified
majority voting would point to a partial power transfer. As a reluctant state loses
its right to veto, a proposal passes in the European Council of Ministers by
majority voting.
Intergovernmentalist Challenge to Neofunctionalism
Albeit neofunctionalist explanations of the immigration harmonization
pattern appear convincingly sound, what alternative answer to the 1980s events
could confront the institutionalist assumption? Some scholars agree with the
neofunctionalist “spillover” effect as the determinant of the immigration policy
harmonization in the 1980s; others discredit it by pinpointing underlying
intergovernmental patterns. Again, neofunctionalists perceive the rise of interest
in the harmonization of immigration policies as functional “spillover” from the
economic cooperation. Mutual effort in the immigration area stemmed from a
“quasi-inevitable byproduct of the expanding Single Market‟s rules.297 The
persistent lack of harmonized immigration policies jeopardized any beneficial
outcomes of the internal market.
Conversely, the state-centric approach emphasizes a different impetus for
harmonization. Firstly, the initial commitment to the Single Market‟s integration
developed before the Single European Act. TREVI provided a security frame into
which manifold immigration issues were inserted when they entered the political
agenda in the 1980s.298 TREVI focused on a factual understanding of migration as
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a security issue and, as early as the 1970s, linked security concerns and migration
as closely related constituents. Interestingly, as mentioned above, immigration in
the 1990s and the 2000s was linked with criminality and security threat. Because
TREVI pinpointed the immigration-security concern paradigm before policy
developments in the European Community, one may argue that the
intergovernmental cooperation began to underline possible threats of uncontrolled
international migration in an interstate, joint manner.
In a sense, the TREVI‟s objectives of a mutual combat against terrorism
among the EC member states had “intergovernmentally” dispersed to areas of
migration and border controls in a gradual process, long before the Single
Market‟s proposals. In addition, Schengen sought to attain a speedier movement
across frontier-free Europe. Both agreements indirectly brought up the need for
the harmonized migration issues before the Single European Act. Therefore,
skeptics of the “spillover” effect highlight the nature of both TREVI and
Schengen as a way to demonstrate that “it is rather difficult to argue that the
Single Market integration alone caused this co-operation, which had begun to
develop prior to the SEA and was linked to attempts to consolidate control over
international migration in the face of some domestic constraints.”299
Guiraudon argues that developing awareness of legal and political
constraints in France, Germany and the Netherlands led to a search for new
European venues for policy development that were more shielded from these
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domestic constraints.300 In a sense, the market integration increased the salience
of immigration concerns, but not caused them.301 Analysis of the Franco-German
initiative and its political will, which presumably initiated the European migration
regime, posed an alarming challenge to the “spillover” logic. According to Herz,
every step of economic and political integration has been made by the states
involved.302 To further confront the notion of the neofunctionalist approach,
intergovernmental cooperation was noticed in the vetoes of Britain and Ireland to
create a Community policy for immigration in the Single European Act.303 Had
the “spillover” mechanism motivated the migration cooperation in the mid-1980s,
all member states would have followed the “common” immigration policy
rhetoric. However, British and Irish vetoes and certain member states‟ resistance
to the European Commission‟s pro-integration White Paper illustrated difficulties
with mechanistic neofunctionalism.304 With respect to the timing of European
cooperation, Guiraudon finds neofunctionalism as an inadequate analytical tool
and posed questions whether “spillover” truly directed the immigration
harmonization in the 1980s. She argues that if “spillover” in fact played a decisive
role in migration integration, it should have derived from earlier integration
efforts.305 It would have stemmed from integration efforts of the free movement
of labor, introduced as early as in the 1960s. Although, as mentioned above, Lu
asserts that the member states‟ cooperation in the migration area spilled over from
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the call for the free movement of labor and was finalized with the internal market
proposals. This argument is rather weak due to the considerable time gap from the
reference to the freedom of workers‟ movement in the late 1950s to its
formalization in the texts of the SEA. Additionally, British opt out from the
legally-binding immigration policy development weakens the practicability of
neofunctionalism. The European Commission took a back seat in these matters,
undermining the theory‟s focus on the institution‟s competence in agenda-setting
sphere.306
Moreover, the recessions of the 1970s and the 1980s had created socioeconomic, domestic distresses. Despite of new political incentives for the member
states to crack down on illegal immigration, the influx of foreigners continued
through family reunification, political asylum, and cheap labor.307 As many statecentric scholars argue, the inability to solve the problem of a growing number of
immigrants and asylum seekers in the EC had served as a key factor for increased
cooperation among the member states.308 The common problem of the 1980s
engendered centrifugal tendencies among domestic groups for mutual resolution.
Because of lack of incapacity to handle them unilaterally, joint socio-political
issues at the domestic level, instead of “spillover” from economic integration and
the SEA, pushed for the interstate harmonization of immigration-related policies.
Intergovernmentalist Challenge to Supranationalism
As an institutionalist would argue, supranationalism has substantially
accredited a rhetoric, which says that the establishment of international
306
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institutions centralizes power in the hands of supranational officials whose
political entrepreneurship promotes integration.309 The gradual
supranationalization of a certain policy area, like immigration, leads to further
empowering of the EU institutions. As I referenced above, the development of a
“common” immigration policy has followed an incremental movement toward
supranationalization in terms of empowerment of EU officials and policymakers.
However, such a gradual and limited harmonization may not necessarily
indicate supranationalization. Some scholars point to a strong intergovernmental
pattern noticeable in the harmonization process. National governments and the
European Council have in fact overly influenced outcomes of treaty-amending
negotiations, by outlining their priorities and deciding on proposals. Some
scholars, including Moravcsik, attribute decisive powers of multilateral
negotiations (treaties) to national governments, as opposed to informal
technocrats. For example, during compromises leading to the Treaty of the
European Union, governments and national groups drafted detailed proposals of
the document. Moravcsik shows through empirical analysis that the European
Commission arrived late with its provisions and the European Parliament‟s
reports were dismissed.310
In the case of the Single European Act‟s negotiations, Moravcsik points
out that the European Commission and the European Parliament had influenced
the turn of the final draft of the SEA. However, their role in mediating was very
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minimal.311 To the contrary, Moravcsik demonstrates the entrepreneurship of EC
officials as futile and redundant, and even sometimes counterproductive.312 The
role of the legendary EC figures, including Jean Monnet, has been exaggerated by
attributing leadership powers to them. Moravcsik states that negotiations initiated
by national governments were efficient, while interventions of the EC institutions
were minimally helpful.313 The scholar tests several treaty-amending decisions
and concludes that supranational actors did not enjoy formal powers and their
presence was an “unintended coincidence” in negotiations.314 In this case, Haas
and Lindberg‟s argument that the Community institutions have been powerful
“midwives” in multilateral negotiations315 runs counter to the state-centric
approach. Similarly, Moravcsik‟s observations neglect Sandholtz‟s view of the
EU institutions as players in defining paths of political influence. 316
With respect to domestic preferences, Moravcsik emphasizes the role of
“imperatives for global economic competitiveness, pressures from national export
industries, Margaret Thatcher‟s economic liberalism, Francois Mitterrand‟s failed
socialism in France and Helmut Kohl‟s acquiescence in the Single Market.”317 In
other words, the scholar accredits economic (self) interest as the driving force of
cooperation and power delegation.318 Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis
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emphasize that activity of the supranational actors does not infer influence.319
Numerous Commission proposals in the 1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s had
outlined ambitious objectives, many of which were oriented toward integration
and the extended rights of migrants. As already referenced, Herz argues that the
member states in the European Council of Ministers who have favored more
restrictive and exclusive policies, rebuked majority of these liberal
communications.320 The sole power of influence and manipulation, Moravcsik
argues, has not affected the outcomes of the treaties. Due to still-present
unanimity in the majority of the immigration issues, fairly liberal proposals by the
European Commission have been lowered down during negotiations in the
European Council of Ministers.321 The inability to attain qualified majority voting
in the European Council of Ministers, outlined as early as in the Treaty of
Amsterdam, has revealed persisting reluctance of some member states to cede
more sovereignty over the immigration issues.
The extended role of the EU institutions in the policy initiation and the
European Parliament‟s co-decision gave teeth to the further creation of an
envisioned “common” immigration policy. To question applicability of the theory
of supranationalism, many scholars have argued that the immigration policy
development has followed a purely intergovernmental pattern, where
empowerment of the EU institutions has not necessarily enhanced their role as
initiators, mobilizers and mediators. The member states have, in fact, used the EU
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as a venue to pursue their state interests. Pooling and delegation of power to the
centralized institutions has aided the countries in reaching a superior outcome by
reducing the transaction costs.322 FRONTEX is an excellent example. Albeit not a
supranational institution, but rather an independent agency, FRONTEX could be
acclaimed as a successful leap forward with respect to collective, harmonized
cooperation on external border issues. However, this independent body has very
limited control over surveillance of national external borders, which stays with the
member states.
The Treaty of Lisbon did not fully “supranationalize” immigration
policies. While it reaffirmed qualified majority voting in the European Council of
Ministers and co-decision in the European Parliament, it kept the area of freedom,
security and justice under shared competence between the European Union and
the member states. The EU did not gain exclusive competence over such sensitive
matters. Moreover, Article 63A (5) of the Treaty states “this Article shall not
affect the right of Member States to determine volume of admission of thirdcountry nationals coming from third countries to their territory in order to seek
work, whether employed or self-employed.”323 Therefore the member states
continue to pursue interest in maintaining the immigration quotas, regardless of
their effect.324 The EU would neither fix quotas nor grant right of admission to
foreign workers. Additionally, the Treaty of Lisbon did not prohibit the EU
member states from entering into agreements outside of the EU framework. If
issues related to migration endanger national security, the European Council of
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Ministers, the European Commission and the European Parliament have no right
in decision making procedure. As in the previous treaties, Britain and Ireland
gained sole right to opt in or opt out in decisions in the area of freedom, security
and justice. This flexibility has undermined the complete communitarization of
immigration policies. Thus the gradual, yet limited, supranationalization of the
immigration policy framework raises questions of whether the EU experience has
followed footsteps of supranationalism, intergovernentalism or perhaps a hybrid
of both.
Applicability of Liberal Intergovernmentalism – Spain as a Case Study
The major assumption of liberal intergovernmentalism is that integration
serves as an outcome of international bargaining with governments as the main
actors. Contrary to the neofunctionalist and supranationalist arguments,
intergovernmentalist scholars argue that national governments initiate, mediate
and mobilize negotiations. Liberal intergovernmentalism explains the
communitarization of immigration policies through processes of Spain‟s national
preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. This statelevel approach provides the empirical evidence of how a member state, through
active advocacy, has influenced creation of the immigration regime at the EU
level. Even though Moravcsik uses his approach to describe official negotiations
between the member states, this section nonetheless looks at Spain‟s ongoing
push for a “common” immigration policy, in a bottom-up manner. In a way, the
Spanish government‟s support for a unified policy could be considered as a
negotiation with other member states and EU officials. Additionally, I limit the
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chronological scope of this section to the sole time period of the last decade
(2000-2010). As I illustrate above, Spain officially began to advocate for a
“common” immigration policy in the late 1990s, thus the liberal
intergovernmentalist approach mainly deals with the first decade of the 2000s.
National Preference Formation
Moravcsik‟s theory of liberal intergovernmentalism emphasizes that
national preferences shape state‟s behavior in international politics. As
intergovernmentalists assert, the state is a major player. However, in reality, the
state is not an actor in itself, but a representative institution for national
preferences. These preferences are developed by social and private groups who
seek to promote differentiated interests.325 Groups or institutions, including
employers, trade unions, civil rights associations, and the Catholic Church, voice
their demands, which then exert influence on politicians and are fulfilled by
governments. Why do national governments accept the role as “transmission
belts”?326 Moravcsik inclines to the view that governments in power want to be
re-elected or are captured by the presented issues.327 As governments‟ actions
revolve around self- interest, their preferences still depend on the preferences of
social actors.328 Although Moravcsik does not attribute the voting public as an
influential social actor, there is a need to see unorganized civil society as an
important tool in national preference formation. The focus on the Spanish
325
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immigration laws cannot neglect the voting public‟s concern with the issue, as it
is turned into demands for toughened immigration stance.
National preference formation finds applicability in the development of
Spanish domestic demands concerning uncontrolled immigration. Spain entered
the decade of 1990s as a new immigration state. This period could be explained as
an intermediate one from the low to the high magnitude of migration issues
among political and social actors in the immigration area. Players who seemed to
influence administrative actions of the government were mainly the employers
who favored regularization programs as a tool to fight with labor shortages,329
hence the acts of 1991 and 1996. Spanish labor unions supported legal
immigration over illegal and thus promoted amnesties, family reunification and
employment-based migration quotas.330 Focus on immigrant integration grew
among the public and civil rights actors. As I discuss below, the Spanish
government‟s stance on the fight against illegal immigration became pronounced
during the Barcelona Conference of 1995. Moreover, the late 1990s and the 2000s
witnessed significant socio-economic events that decisively impacted public
opinion and furthered the government‟s stance on illegal immigration.
Undoubtedly, the 2000s decade had shown national preference formation. Ever
since, the voting public and politicians have become the major players in shaping
policies in this particular field.
As I already referenced, El Ejido became a scene of collective conflict
with political and social consequences. This event can be seen as an initiative to
329
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shape national preferences, overwhelmingly based on the voting public. It is
important to mention that people‟s negative opinion on illegal immigration has
been greatly influenced by right-wing media coverage and political campaigning.
Immigrants became defined not only as foreigners, but also as criminals. The
public, infuriated by a criminal act in El Ejido, became a target of media-fed antiimmigration propaganda. Right-wing politicians shaped their approach to the
event based on the dominant attitudes and views of the public. After the incident,
Juan Enciso, mayor of El Ejido and a member of the Partido Popular, supported
violent acts of Spaniards against immigrants. Enciso emphasized that the PP stood
for the Spanish people (the voters); consensus would thus mean heightened
support for the PP.331
El Ejido became a politicized playing field through which the opposition
party not only aimed to fulfill national preferences for restrictive immigration, but
also to secure its own self-interest of being elected. The PP won the March 2000
elections with an increase of six percent on results from 1996 to 2000.332
Table 6 – Electoral gain of the Partido Popular in 2000 (as compared to 1996)
PP results
(General Elections
2000)
63.6%

Difference 19962000

El Ejido

PP results
(General Elections
1996)
46.2%

Spain

38.6%

44.2%

+5.6%

Source: Zapata-Barrero, “Spanish Challenges,” 252.
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+17.4%

As the table shows, citizens expressed their support for the PP, which targeted
increasing insecurity and delinquency.333 In other words, the public‟s fear of
augmenting crime among immigrants was projected on the decisions undertaken
by the government. I could argue that El Ejido sped up the Spanish government‟s
push for the forthcoming restrictive immigration law in Spain. Its objectives to
tighten up external border controls and to fight against undocumented immigrants
already found agreement with EU demands.
Other external and internal factors that stimulated negative attitudes of the
population were the “9/11” terrorist attacks, the Madrid bombings in 2004,the
Ceuta and Melilla events in 2005 and the London bombing in 2005. Playing on
fears generated by the “9/11,” former Prime Minister Aznar declared,
“Immigration and terrorism not properly dealt with have generated radicalism.”334
Similarly to “9/11,” the terrorist attack from March 11, 2004, near Atocha railway
station in Madrid, turned the world‟s eyes on the Spanish capital.335 Even though
not all suspects of the attack were illegal immigrants, this terrible event, which
left 191 casualties, became highly politicized by the Spanish government in order
to legitimize further securitization of immigration politics. Moreover, the media
focus on Ceuta and Melilla amplified in September and October 2005, when
several hundred sub-Saharan African migrants attacked the border of the
enclaves. This act led to the death of more than a dozen migrants who desperately
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searched a more prosperous life.336 It further cultivated the widening gap between
“us” and “others” within the Spanish society.
The recent economic crisis has also attributed to national preference
formation due to the rise of unemployment among both Spaniards and
immigrants. The official 20 percent unemployment figure has frightened
concerned politicians and the public.337 During a recession, employers curtail
search for cheap labor, and civil rights groups are not strong enough to lobby for
more expansive immigration policies. Theoretically, the costs of immigration
become more pronounced and include a drain of the social security system.338
Immigrants are seen as scapegoats, targeted by the public, media, and politicians.
Despite Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero‟s long proclaimed support
for equal social rights for immigrants, the recent LO 2/2009 is, in fact, the latest
attempt by the socialist government to assuage the growing discontent in a society
hurt by the economic crisis.339
Interstate Bargaining
Another step in Spain‟s negotiations for a “common” immigration policy
is interstate bargaining. Moravcsik‟s three-part model of EU negotiations
specifically focuses on Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), which lead to
treaty amendments. Interstate bargaining refers to agreements and compromises
336
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gained at such meetings. Closa and Heywood devote a chapter of their book,
entitled Shaping the Union and Defending National Interests, on the Spain‟s
intergovernmentalist approach to policymaking at the EU level.340 One of the
dimensions through which Spain has pursued its national interests at the EU level
is IGCs and enlargement negotiations. Similarly to Moravcsik‟s argument, the
Spanish government has used such official gatherings as a way to secure its
standpoint on various issues. With respect to the Justice and Home Affairs, Spain
played a very active role during the Treaty of Amsterdam‟s negotiations in 1996.
For instance, its negotiators stressed the need to “communitarize” the third pillar
and to incorporate the Schengen Agreements into the Treaty of Amsterdam.341
As the member states defend their national interests at the IGCs, a study of
a country‟s cooperation with the other EU member states and of numerous
agreements outside of the IGC realm can also yield outcomes lined with liberal
intergovernmentalism. Assumingly, when national preference formation creates a
majority consensus among the domestic actors, the Spanish government may
proceed and pursue a policy based on a consensus at the intergovernmental level.
Negotiations depend on relative power of the states involved.342 The pattern of
policy interdependence becomes a crucial instrument. As Moravcsik argues, “the
power of each government is inversely proportional to the relative value it places
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on an argument compared to the outcome of its best alternative.”343 If a
government wants to achieve something, it is willing to compromise.344
There is no doubt that the Spanish government and the political parties (on
left and right of the ideological spectrum) have heavily depended on agreements
and mutual cooperation, which address border controls and illegal immigration.
Its geographical location and historical/cultural links to sending countries have
shaped attitudes of other EU member states as facilitators in the fight against
unwanted immigration. Spain‟s position as a gatekeeper has made it more
vulnerable to favorable agreements reached with other states, mainly France or
other Mediterranean countries. One of the main arguments that the Spanish
government has used is that immigration is not a Spanish problem, but a European
one. The southern borders of Spain are no longer national borders; they are also
European frontiers.
Closa and Heywood‟s second dimension of pursuit of national interests is
the use of the EU Presidency to steer policies in a particular dimension.345 As
already emphasized, the Spanish Presidency of the European Council of Ministers
in 2002 underscored the Partido Popular‟s stance on a “common” immigration
policy with the emphasis on combating terrorism and illegal immigration and
fortifying border controls. Many can observe the conservative government‟s
success in promoting a restrictive stance on the “common” immigration policy
regime. Prime Minister Aznar and Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi
formed a coalition at the Seville Summit against “permissive” immigration
343
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proposals of their EU neighbors.346 The officials favored restrictive immigration
measures that targeted undocumented foreigners, living in Spain and Italy
illegally. Being of vulnerable geographical locations, both member states have
endorsed the “common” immigration policy rhetoric based on their national
interests.
Albeit not referenced in this research work, Closa and Heywood‟s third
dimension refers to “insider policies” - placing nationals in key positions in
Brussels in order to shape policies from the inside. Such a venue to influence
national interests is incorporated into Moravcsik‟s interstate bargaining part due
to national representatives‟ role as middle men in intergovernmental negotiations.
The Spanish government, in relation to its advocacy for a “common” immigration
policy, does not solely constitute a body of politicians and bureaucratic
administration within national borders. It also includes personnel hired by the
Permanent Representation (REPER) in Brussels, European Commission
employees, and national officials in top ranking positions. As Closa and Heywood
add, “presence in EU institutions does not necessarily equate to real influencealthough it is likely that control over top positions helps to exert some influence
on those areas which are deemed sensitive issues for Spain.”347
Moreover, Spain‟s bargaining power was in the spot light at the informal
meeting of the EU heads of state or government in Lahti, Finland, in October
2006. Zapatero urged fellow EU leaders to finance boats, planes and money in
order to help the Mediterranean countries to deal with the influx of undocumented
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immigrants from Africa. According to the Prime Minister, a growing problem
with uncontrolled migration has drained the Spanish government‟s resources.348
While some EU member states showed their willingness to support Spain, others
voiced their discontent, blaming Spain for using the EU and its member states as a
venue to fulfill its domestic goals.
Spain has also undertaken bilateral agreements with other EU member
states (i.e. Italy and France) in order to strengthen its position in a battle against
uncontrolled inflow of immigrants. As an outcome, the country has effectively
persuaded many states that a unilateral approach is impotent in resolving an
immigration problem. Spain‟s nearly desperate position in dealing with illegal
migration issues at the domestic level puts it in a situation of willing to
compromise certain interests in order to distribute the burden among other
participating states. Henceforth, if a “common” immigration policy becomes
finalized, Spain may find itself in a deadlock position with respect to its
legalization acts, despite executive competence of national states over
regularization programs. European politicians from Austria, the Netherlands and
Germany voiced their discontentment to the Spanish government for performing
the large-scale regularization program in 2005.349 Previous processes also fell
under a spell of voluminous criticism at the national and international levels.
Unlike the United Kingdom and Ireland, Spain has supported the full
harmonization of immigration policies at the expense of its veto power. Spanish
legislators clearly have understood the potential cost of instituting the legally348
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binding policy. The European Parliament would gain co-decision; the Council of
Ministers would have the power of qualified majority voting. Such a compromise
is worthwhile if Spain is to receive financial aid and effectively influence EU
objectives with its domestic interests.
Institutional Choice
The central institutional choice in the EU is whether and how to pool and
delegate sovereignty to the EU level. Pooling refers to the application of majority
decisions in the European Council of Ministers; delegation concerns the powers
given to the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.350
According to Moravcsik‟s conclusions, states pool and delegate sovereignty to
obtain more credible commitments. Spain is a part of a group of European states
that have viewed this institutional choice for the immigration regime as a
guarantee to future decisions, cooperation and improved implementation of
agreements.351 Spain‟s active participation in the construction of a “common”
immigration policy officially dates back to its 2002 EU Presidency.352 Ever since,
the Spanish government has demonstrated its support to put immigration issues on
the European agenda.353
The socio-economic issues of the 2000s not only mobilized the formation
of national preferences, but also led to the realization that national and bilateral
controls over external borders and illegal immigration are unfeasible. Both the
Partido Popular (early 2000s) and the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (2004
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onward) pursued the communitarization of policies not only to get more credible
commitments, but also for economic interests at the national level. The Spanish
government has advertised illegal immigration as not just a Spanish problem, but
also a European one. While the 1980s and the 1990s were characterized by the
unfolding EU‟s pressure on Spain to control its external border, recently it is
Spain who has pushed the EU to acknowledge reinforcement of external border
controls as a European task.354 Spain‟s inability to solitarily deal with
undocumented immigrants leaves no other option but to turn to Europe for
financial and material resources. As I already stated, the EU has served as a
supplementary aid to the member states.355 Additionally, the Spanish government
has emphasized immigration as an EU problem mainly as an effective venue to
distribute the immigration burden across the EU member states. It has also called
for joint EU operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic coast of Africa,
especially after the 2005 Ceuta and Melilla crisis.356 The latter event decisively
influenced Spain‟s active role in the drafting of the Global Approach in 2005.
It is important to mention that Spain‟s advocacy for strengthened external
policy dates back to the 1990s. In 1995, former Spanish foreign minister Javier
Solana organized the Barcelona Conference, which gathered ministers for foreign
affairs from 15 EU member states and 12 non-EU member countries, mainly from
North Africa.357 The EU incorporated the ten-year program of the Barcelona
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Declaration, often referred to as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as a major
external policy of the EU. 358
The Barcelona Process was initiated to address Europe‟s concerns and
challenges faced with its back-door neighbors in the Mediterranean basin. Its
work program focused on a myriad of issues, including “cooperation in the field
of illegal immigration, the fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, international
crime and corruption.”359 Many have declared the ten-year initiative as mainly
ineffective due to its failure to meet the outlined agenda. The “9/11” incidents and
the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe diverged economic development and
prosperity to national security.360 In 2008, French President Sarkozy re-launched
the Barcelona Process under the new name of the Union for the Mediterranean.
Thus far, the latter program has aimed at promoting stability throughout the
Mediterranean region.
According to Joslyn R.Q. Osten‟s conclusions, the Barcelona Process was
an initiative based on Moravcsik‟s assumption that “each state seeks to realize its
distinctive preferences under varying constraints imposed by the preferences of
other states.”361 Therefore, Spain and its Southern European counterparts saw the
Barcelona Process as a venue to alleviate national issues, supporting Moravcsik‟s
system of institutional choice.
To sum up, the EU member states have approved restrictive
communitarization of highly-contested issues in order to enhance national control
358
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over them.362 As seen, the Spanish government has advocated pooling and
delegation for such reasons as mutual commitments, financial benefits, fulfillment
of domestic demands by application of EU restrictive objectives, and gradual
projection of its domestic policies onto the EU level. In a sense, the financiallybased reasons behind advocacy have aimed at enhancing national control and
sovereignty over immigration.
Furthermore, if a “common” immigration policy is implemented at the EU
level, Spain will not only introduce minor changes to its legal framework, but it
will attain its goal of restrictive stance on illegal immigration and external border
controls. Pooling and delegation of sovereignty would represent more of a
reinforcement and redefinition of the state‟s control over immigration issues.
Therefore, national sovereignty would not be fully eroded. To the contrary, Spain
would strengthen its domestic control by circumventing institutional constraints.
Legislators in support of more restrictive policies will be able to address the EU
as a body, which would excuse (controversial) domestic law updates.

362

Givens and Luedtke, “The Politics of EU Immigration Policy.”

130

Chapter 6: Analytical Conclusions
Neofunctionalism, supranationalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism
have left a mark on our understanding of over a half-a-century-long European
integration. The study of European integration would be far from advanced
without their theoretical contribution. After examining the historical evolution of
a “common” immigration policy at the EU level and the simultaneously evolving
Spanish immigration laws, a number of interpretations emerge from my analysis.
To briefly summarize, neofunctionalists accredit the Single European Act
as a precursor to the harmonization of immigration policies at the EU level.
Functional “spillover” from the creation of the Single Market into the “common”
immigration policy rhetoric likely initiated years of cooperative development of
the single migration regime. Like intergovernmentalists, neofunctionalists assert
that once the member states understood the costs of non-EC immigration policies,
they began to lobby for a harmonized regime, targeting external border controls
and restrictive legislations against illegal migrants. Neofunctionalists accredit
functional “spillover,” whereas the state-centric students praise interstate
cooperation (mainly the Franco-German partnership) as an impetus of the
immigration harmonization. Basing my analyses on secondary texts and empirical
evidence, I argue that the political power behind French and German cooperation
in the 1980s markedly influenced the harmonization of the migratory regime.
Initial commitment to the Single Market developed before implementation
of the Single European Act‟s text. The intergovernmental TREVI provided a
security frame into which migration issues as inserted when they entered the
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political agenda in the 1980s.363 The TREVI‟s objectives of combating terrorism
among the European governments had influenced the areas of illegal immigration
and border controls in a gradual process, long before the Single Market proposals.
After TREVI, the Schengen Agreements were concluded outside of the
framework of the European Community. Both agreements indirectly referenced
the need to harmonize migration policies before the implementation of the SEA.
The two heads of state, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French president
François Mitterrand, actively promoted the project.364As Douglas Webber also
states, "It was the French and German governments‟ decision to dismantle the
reciprocal border controls, reached at Saarbrücken in 1984, that paved the way for
the adoption of the Schengen Accord less than a year later."365
Although the Franco-German political and economic interests are not a
cornerstone of my argument, it is noteworthy that the outcome of such a close
collaboration, along with other Northern European states, has weakened the
position of the neofunctionalist theory as a viable explanation to the initiation of
the harmonization process of immigration policies. As a matter of fact, I identify
the first Spanish immigration law, LO 7/1985, and its timing as a crucial key. In
reality, the so-called EC pressure on the Spanish government to implement
restrictive policies clearly embedded Franco-German interests. As LO 7/1985
closely aligned with Schengen objectives, it calmed Northern European states'
363
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fears of a potential, sudden chaos fueled by incoming immigrants, who would use
Spain as a convenient gateway. Even though Spain was not yet a part of Schengen
in 1985, France, Germany and the Benelux countries aspired to influence the
Southern country's immigration policies for future security benefits, regardless of
the law's inadequacy with Spain‟s domestic demands. I can thus argue that
national interests of the member states, as noticeable in interstate cooperation,
serve as a more plausible explanation than a coincidental “spill over” from
economic integration (the Single Market) to political integration. Moreover,
British and Irish opt out from the Schengen Agreements and from a further
harmonization accredits the powerful role of the state. I am inclined to the view
that (liberal) intergovernmentalism is a more likely explanation of the initiation of
the European immigration policy regime. It is impossible to escape the prevalent
importance of the states as political players in the domain of European
integration.
With regards to supranationalism, it would be fallacious to state that the
EU member states have not moved toward the communitarization of the migration
regime. According to the above examined legal documents, the unification of
immigration policies has followed a very slow and gradual route. Only since the
Treaty of Lisbon have the member states released more powers to the EU
institutions. The most recent treaty could be seen as a culminating act in the
creation of a “common” immigration policy. However, it is noticeable that a
moderate movement toward the final objective has unfolded in an
intergovernmental fashion. The states have continued to be the major players with
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shared knowledge, problems, and identities, for which they have constructed
European solutions. Such a dense cooperation of governments at various levels
has opened doors to further policy implementation in a much smoother manner.366
As Moravcsik argues, the European Union is a series of intergovernmental
negotiations.367 In support of the latter argument, Moravcsik describes the Single
European Act as a union of elites between EU officials and the European business
interest groups. Its negotiating history is more consistent with an explanation that
the EU reform rested on interstate bargains between the Community‟s
superpowers: the United Kingdom, France and Germany.368
The gradual harmonization of the immigration regime can be understood
through scrutiny of countries that have been capable of achieving goals via
intergovernmental negotiations and bargaining, rather than via a central authority
in charge of making and enforcing decisions.369 Pooling and delegation of control
to the supranational institutions helps states to reach a superior outcome by
reducing transaction costs. Additionally, domestic actors who benefit from
common policies and consensus have favored such an institutional choice.370
In my opinion, the theory of supranationalism partially explains the
process of the development of a “common” immigration policy. Unlike
supranationalists, I argue that the EU institutions are not the major powerhouses
of European integration. Instead, I would accredit the states as the leaders in
deciding upon the degree of further cooperation. Therefore, a “common”
366
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immigration policy would not necessarily resemble a pure state of
supranationalism per se; rather, it would reflect incomplete supranationalization,
with strong intergovernmentalist characteristics. This statement leads me to
incorporate Lahav‟s argument that a hybrid of supranationalism and
intergovernmentalism defines power over a (restrictive) “common” immigration
policy.371
The prevailing goal of national governments does not have to be
protection of sovereignty at all times. As Donald J. Puchala emphasizes,
"European governments by and large favor European integration, and they are
certainly less preoccupied with sovereignty than they are interested in deriving
benefits from international collaboration."372 The latter argument supports
Moravcsik's third part of the EU negotiations scheme - institutional choice.
National governments benefit more from pooling and delegation of decisions to
the EU level, assuring that such decisions would reflect their interests.
Presumably, if a “common” immigration policy becomes constituted, the
role of the state will diminish at the expense of increasing importance of the
European Commission and the European Parliament. However, the states will
continue to have decisive impact on this issue. Puchala's comment perfectly
portrays this EU-member state symbiotic relationship:
the governing of Europe, most of which already is or predictably
will be within the EU, has a great deal to do with the functioning
of the EU institutions. But the origins of this governance and its
future evolution certainly have much to do with the explicit interest
of Member States, their initiatives and influence and asymmetries
in power among them. If Europe is still the 'bag o marbles' that
371
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Andrew Shonfield likened many years ago, the bag has over the
time become increasingly important and the individual marbles
perhaps less so. But without the marbles the bag would be
empty.373
The Spanish government has actively and successfully influenced the EU
framework with national interests. While in the mid-1990s it was the EU who
pressed Spain for enforced external border surveillance, it is currently Spain who
has promoted tightened frontier controls since its “Plan Sur” and SIVE enactment.
The country developed its national approach into a mainstream European
problem,374 fulfilling its domestic (economic) demands. The 2010 Spanish
Presidency of the European Council of Ministers urged for more financial
resources, clearer rules and specialist offices for FRONTEX.375 Spain, as one of
the Shonfield‟s marbles in the bag, has blatantly emphasized its geographical
position and thus its opinion has considerably contributed to the construction of a
“common” immigration policy.
I have examined the case study of Spain through the prism of liberal
intergovernmentalism. As I already stated, Moravcsik‟s three-tier scheme
concentrates on official negotiations, such as Intergovernmental Conferences
(IGCs). However, I distance myself from this approach and introduce his method
within the lines of the Spanish government and its relation to other national,
international and supranational players. As I already demonstrated, national
preference formation, interstate bargaining, and institutional choice are
373
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mechanisms present at national and international levels in periods between treaty
negotiations. Moravcsik is right in insisting that the treaties are building blocks of
the European Union and treaty amending documents are usually induced by welldefined national preferences. Such preferences are nurtured over time. Internal
issues, especially socio-economic and political, are necessary to shape
government‟s preferences, which are then discussed and bargained via the
interstate manner, and eventually pushed in a bottom-up way to the EU level.
With respect to national preferences, I argue that liberal
intergovernmentalism does find (perhaps partial) applicability to the case study of
Spain and its immigration law evolution. I include the word "partial" because I
have taken the voting public into consideration. Citizens are often the architects as
to who influences governmental decisions. In a democratic country like Spain, the
people vote for politicians, who promise to satisfy some of the public's
expectations solely for re-electoral benefits. In the case of illegal immigration and
external border controls, the government in power has not only fulfilled some of
the public concerns, but also awarded itself with economic self-interest.
Moravcsik would agree that interstate cooperation leads to economic gains
at the national level. As I remarked, one of the reasons for pooling and delegation
of sovereignty has been an economic gain of financial support to fight
uncontrolled immigration. Moravcsik writes, "When domestic policy instruments
remain effective, governments will continue to maintain them; but where
governments have exhausted all cost-effective domestic means of achieving
domestic policy targets, they have an incentive to turn to international
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coordination."376 In this sense, the Spanish government has not been able to deal
with such a large number of illegal (and legal) immigrants with respect to social
services costs, deportation, surveillance of border controls, etc. Therefore, joint
gains (economic cooperation and financial aid) and expected utility (more
restrictive policies envisaged by the EU) have been high.
I agree with Ramin Shafagatov and Aygun Mirzayeva who infer that
liberal intergovernmentalist theory fits well the explanation of the process of the
development of a “common” immigration policy because domestic political
factors and national governments play a decisive role in its development.377 That
said, Givens and Luedtke argue that when the political salience is high (like in the
case of immigration issues), national governments either block harmonization, or
allow only a restrictive pathway of harmonization at the EU level.378 Schain
makes a similar observation. He asserts that, although the progress has been
noticeable with regards to the fight against illegal immigration and border control,
failure to harmonize immigration policies stems from the fact that if cooperation
takes place, it tends to support control and exclusion, rather than expansion and
harmonization. He adds that the emphasis on exclusion and restriction reflects
preferences of the ministries (of interior and justice) that are in charge of the
process and that dominate the institutional space.379 Therefore, national
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governments decide on the degree of the policy development at the EU level.
Liberal intergovernmentalists argue that states pursue domestic preferences (such
as the harmonization of immigration policies) at the supranational level because it
serves as an extension of their domestic politics.
Therefore, according to my above analyses, paradoxically,
supranationalism and (liberal) intergovernmentalism are both plausible theories
applicable to the process of the development of a “common” immigration policy.
Arguably, the latter framework appears to be the driving motor of a future, unified
policy. This process of "intergovernmentalist supranationalization," as
demonstrated at the EU and the national levels, has shown that Spain continues to
play a leading role in shaping a “common” immigration policy. The EU
institutions have indeed gained more power over the last decade or so.
Nevertheless, the nature of the power upgrade has solely depended on decisions
undertaken by national actors. As Gebbes mentions,
Member states now share power- that much is clear- but this does
not mean that their relevance is waning. Instead, EU
responsibilities provide new international venues for the pursuit of
policy objectives. Cooperation has thus far tended to strengthen the
hands of the executive branches of national governments…380
Examination of the three theories of European integration points to
different mechanisms, which can be applicable to the explanation of the policy
creation. According to my observations, initiation of the immigration policy
harmonization seemed to follow planned interstate cooperation rather than the
“spillover” process of neofunctionalism. External negotiations and agreements
had ignited over-two-decades-long movement toward the harmonization of
380
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migration policies, thus supporting an argument that intergovernmental talks have
in fact been powerful tools in igniting the communitarization of the migration
regime at the European level.
Supranationalism is a persuasive theory, which, interestingly, appears to
be a continuation of neofunctionalism. If ever reached, the communitarization of
immigration policies would ultimately reflect an "intergovernmentalist
supranationalization," with shared power between the nation states and the EU
institutions. The establishment of the policy would support supranationalist
sentiments; however, the real powerhouses - the member state, indisputably
including Spain – would continue to monitor and direct its development from
“behind the curtains.”
Concluding Remarks
One can observe that the phenomenon of the European Union and its
policymaking has bred two camps of nation states: laggards and leaders. Spain,
with respect to the “common” immigration policy development, has undoubtedly
been the latter. Through processing and analyzing primary and secondary sources,
I conclude that, in the late 1990s, Spain has emerged as one of the few major
voices in the non-monolithic process of shaping a “common” immigration policy.
By using the EU as an effective arena to resolve domestic issues, the Spanish
governments (socialist and conservative) have been able to constitute ideas and
concepts, which are now embedded in the EU immigration rhetoric. The country‟s
geopolitical location has allowed its central government to edge out as a powerful
state, which sits behind drafting of a “common” immigration policy along with
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countries like Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. Thanks to
successful lobbying activities of the Spanish conservative government,
immigration has become a Europe-wide securitized and criminalized topic.
Thus, the development of the “common” immigration policy regime
supports an “intergovernmentalist supranationalization.” I received affirmative
results from the application of Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism to the
case study of Spain. The description of the Spanish regularization programs
supports an argument that the country has held the steering wheel, thus posing a
challenge to Sandholtz‟s assertion that the EU institutions are the powerhouses in
defining paths of political influence.381
The case study of the Spanish legalization acts has unraveled a limited
scope of the EU control over the field of illegal immigration. National
governments secured the power to deal with immigrant statuses at the domestic
level. As Elizabeth Collett from Migration Policy Institute mentions, early drafts
of the Stockholm Program had proposed that the European Commission would in
fact draft a common approach to legalization processes in order to ensure that
immigrants are treated similarly across the EU.382 However, due to a politically
sensitive issue that this policy area has played, the member states successfully
safeguarded exclusive competence over this subject. As we observe, Spain took
advantage of this ongoing privilege and introduced several regularization
programs since the mid-1980s. Despite discontent voiced by several EU heads of
381
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government or state, the Spanish government has so far legalized over one million
undocumented immigrants in order to address domestic demands.
How do these recurring instances apply to the concluding findings? They
certainly demonstrate that Spain‟s national interests undermine the EU‟s pressure
in certain areas. The state's importance is once again noticeable when
rationalizing regularization programs. So far, these countermeasures have
challenged the EU restrictive objectives despite the fact that the Spanish
government has recently favored more toughened laws. A potential “common”
immigration policy would have a limited scope, thus leaving many of its parts
within exclusive competence of the states.
Recent Economic Downturn - Challenge?
Undoubtedly, the current economic downturn has played a significant role
in migratory inflows to the European continent. Numerous newspaper headlines
have confirmed that immigration to Europe has slowed down due to effective
enforcement of external border patrols and the extensive impact of the economic
stagnation. I would refrain from absorbing such generalized information at a face
value. The 2011 Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have accelerated an
upsurge of illegal immigration not only into Southern Europe, but also the whole
old continent. Moreover, the 2010-2011 Greece‟s incident with uncontrolled
inflow of foreigners (mainly from Turkey) has shown that undocumented
migrants continue to find effective routes to cross the gates of the prosperous
world. With regards to a “common” immigration policy, what is the future of the
unified migration regime? Is it more of a feasible, or an obsolete, goal?
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According to Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al from the Migration Policy
Institute, public expectations about immigration‟s impact may become more acute
due to an economic recession. Undoubtedly, an economic turmoil has a potential
to fuel anti-immigrant sentiments, which are then harmful to community
integration.383 One can only briefly study public reactions to immigrant
population residing in the EU to find a grain of truth in the above statement. More
restrictive measures have also been undertaken by the EU heads of state or
government (i.e. the Netherlands, Denmark, and France) regarding illegal
immigration. Emphasis on the costs of immigration is a common tactic; foreigners
are blamed for draining of the social security system.384 Immigrants are turned
into scapegoats, so easily targeted by the public, media, and politicians.
In my opinion, the development of a “common” immigration policy will
face either one of the two scenarios: ultimately come into effect as a very
restrictive community law (fighting against illegal immigration, reducing family
reunification, reducing the number of labor visas, and amplifying external border
patrols); or stagnate (similarly to the integration slowdown caused by the 1970s
oil crisis and its economic downturn) and continue to serve as a mere rhetoric,
postponed for future years to come. In the latter case, the member states will
continue to exercise control over their national immigration laws, with reluctant
transposition of any forthcoming EU directives and regulations. It is plausible that
intergovernmental cooperation would pave the way.
383

Demetrios G. Papademetriou et al, “Migration and the Economic Downturn: What to Expect in
the European Union,” Migration Policy Institute: Transatlantic Council on Migration (January
2009), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/EU_Recession_backgrounder.pdf (accessed
January 27, 2011).
384
Kern, “Spain‟s Immigration System.”

143

Bibliography
Primary Sources
EU Official Documents
Council of European Union. “Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting
in Laeken – 14 and 15 December 2001.” December 14-15, 2001.
--------. “Single European Act.” September 9, 1985.
----------. “Thessaloniki European Council: Presidency Conclusions.” October 1,
2003.
Europa. “Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.” November
27-28, 1995.
--------. “Summary of the Treaty of Nice.” January 31, 2001.
--------. “Treaties and Law.”
European Commission. “Tampere: Kick-Start to the EU‟s Policy for Justice and
Home Affairs.” Information and Communication Unit of the
Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs. Brussels, Belgium, August
2002.
European Union Law. “Amendments to the Treaty on European Union and to the
Treaty Establishing the European Community.”
---------“Council Decision of 8 June 2004 establishing the Visa Information
System (VIS).” Official Journal of European Union.
--------. “Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001of 15 March 2001 listing the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing
the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that
requirement,” Official Journal of European Union.
--------. “Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing
a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.” Official
Journal of the European Union.
--------. “Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 18
June 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures

144

against of illegally staying third country nationals.” Official Journal of the
European Union.
--------. “Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and the
Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, operation and use of
the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II).” Official
Journal of European Union.
--------. “Treaty of Amsterdam.” November 10, 1997.
--------. “Treaty of European Union.” July 29, 1992.
--------. “The Schengen Aquis.” Official Journal of European Communities.
September 22, 2000.
“Guidelines for a Community Policy on Migration: Commission Communication
Transmitted to the Council on March 1985 (COM (85) 48 final).”
Bulletin of the European Communities 9 (1985), from Archive of
European Integration,
http://aei.pitt.edu/1256/1/migration_policy_COM_85_48.pdf (accessed
February 18, 2011).
L'immigration, l'integration, l'asile et le developpement solidaire [Ministry of
Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Codevelopment of
France]. “The European Pact on Immigration and Asylum.”
http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Plaquette_EN.pdf (accessed
February 10, 2009).
Presidency Conclusions. “The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom,
Security and Justice in the European Union.” 4-5 November, 2004.
Spain’s Official Documents
Instituto Nacional de Estatística [National Institute of Statistics]. “Municipal
Register: Foreign Population (Thousands).”
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft20%2Fe245&fil
e=inebase&L= 1 (accessed January 14, 2011)
Ministerio del Interior del Gobierno de España, [Ministry of the Interior of the
Government of Spain]. “Preámbulo de la Ley Orgánica [Preamble to the
Organic Law 2/2009].” http://www.mir.es/SGACAVT/derecho/lo/lo042000.html#motivo3 (accessed November 20, 2010).
Other Official Documents

145

Council of Europe. “Reguralisation Programmes for Irregular Migrants.”
Parliamentary Assembly, July 6, 2007.
“Tampere Summit Conclusions. 15-16 October, 1999.” Statewatch (2008),
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2008/aug/tamp.html (accessed November
10, 2009).
The Stockholm Program: An open and secure Europe serving the citizen.”
Statewatch, October, 2010,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/oct/stockholm-draft-presidencyprogramme.pdf (accessed October 31, 2010)
“White Paper: Treaty of Seville Declarations,” Brandenburg University of
Applied Sciences. Dublin: Stationery Office, 2002, http://www.fhbrandenburg.de/~brasche/EU/k1/treaty_nice_irish_white_paper_2002.pdf
(accessed November 15, 2009).
Secondary Sources
European Integration Theories
Blumer, Simon. “Domestic Politics and European Community Policy Making.” In
The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European
Integration, edited by Brent F. Nelsen and Alexander C-G. Stubb, 141152. Boulder; London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994.
Brady, Hugo. “European Migration Policy: An A-Z.” Centre for European
Reform (February 2008), http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_813.pdf
(accessed February 6, 2011).
Cram, Laura. “Integration Theory and the Study of the European Policy Process.”
In European Union: Power and Policy-making, edited by Jeremy
Richardson, 51-70. London: Routledge, 2001.
Haas, Ernst. “The „Uniting of Europe‟ and the Uniting of Latin America.” Journal
of Common Market Studies, 5 (June 1967): 315-343.
---------. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 19501957. London: Stevens, 1958.
---------. “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish
of Pretheorizing.” In Regional Integration, edited by Leon Lindberg and
Stuart Scheingold, 3-42. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1971.

146

Haas, Ernst, and Philippe Schmitter. “Economic and Differential Patterns of
Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America.”
International Organization, 18, no. 4 (Autumn 1964): 705-737.
Hansen, Roger. “Regional Integration: Reflections on a Decade of Theoretical
Efforts.” World Politics 21, no. 2 (January 1969): 242-271.
Hoffman, Stanley. “Discord in Community: The North Atlantic Area as a Partial
International System.” International Organization 17, no.3 (Summer
1963): 521-549.
----------. “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of
Western Europe.” Daedalus 95, no. 2 (Spring 1966): 862-915.
Laursen, Finn. “Theory and Practice of Regional Integration.” Miami-Florida
European Union Center of Excellence: Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman
Paper Series 8, no. 3 (February 2008),
http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/LaursenLongSympos08RegIntegedi.pdf
(accessed September 30, 2009).
Leal-Arcas, Rafael. “Theories of Supranationalism in the EU.” Bepress Legal
Series, paper 1790 (2006): 1-23,
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8481&context=express
o (accessed August 5, 2009).
Lindberg, Leon N. The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963.
Menon, Anand, and Stephen Weatherill. “Transnational Legitimacy in a
Globalising World: How the European Union Rescues its States.” West
European Politics 31, no. 3 (May 2008): 397- 416.
Monar, Jörg. “Justice and Home Affairs.” Journal of Common Market Studies 48,
no. (supplement) 1 (September 2010): 143-162.
Monnet, Jean. “A Ferment of Change.” In The European Union: Readings on the
Theory and Practice of European Integration, edited by Brent F. Nelsen
and Alexander C-G. Stubb, 17-24. Boulder; London: Lynne Reinner
Publishers, 1994.
Moravcsik, Andrew. “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and
International Cooperation.” International Organization 53, no.2 (Spring
1999): 267-306.

147

---------. “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community.” International
Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter, 1991): 19-56.
---------. “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach.” Journal of Common Market Studies 31,
no.4 (December, 1993): 474-524.
---------. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics.” International Organization 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 513-553.
---------. The Choice of Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Moravcsik, Andrew, and Frank Schimmelfenning. “Liberal
Intergovernmentalism.” In European Integration Theory, edited by Antje
Wiener and Thomas Diez, 67-87.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Moravcsik, Andrew, and Kalypso Nicolaidis. “Explaining the Treaty of
Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions.” Journal of Common Market
Studies 37, no.1 (March 1999): 59-85.
Mutimer, David. “1992 and the Political Integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism
Reconsidered.” Journal of European Integration 13, no.1 (Autumn 1989):
75-101.
Niemann, Arne, and Philippe C. Schmitter. “Neofunctionalism.” In European
Integration Theory, edited by Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez, 45-66.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Nugent, Neill. The Government and Politics of the European Union. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 1999.
Osten, Joslyn R.Q. “The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: What Kind of Policy Is
It and What Did It Accomplish?” MA Thesis (DePaul University,
Chicago, IL: 2007): 1-112.
Puchala, Donald J. “Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European
Integration: A Review Article.” Journal of Common Market Studies 37,
no. 2 (June 1999): 317-331.
Rosamond, Ben. Theories of European Integration. New York: St. Martin‟s Press,
2000.
Sandholtz, Wayne. “Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to
European Institutions.” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 3
(September 1996): 403-429.

148

Smith, Steve. “International Theory: European Integration.” In International
Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, edited by
Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams, 33-58. London: Routledge,
2000.
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe. “Neofunctionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20, no. 1 (1991): 1-22.
Weiler, Joseph. “The Community System: the Dual Character of
Supranationalism.” Yearbook of European Law 1 (1981): 257-306.
A “Common” Immigration Policy
Bendel, Petra. “Everything under Control? The European Union‟s Policies and
Politics of Immigration,” in The Europeanization of National Policies and
Politics of Immigration, edited by Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette, 32-48.
Hamprshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
Bendel, Petra. “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still Bringing Up the
Walls for Fortress Europe?” Migration Letters 2, no. 1 (April 2005): 2031, http://www.migrationletters.com/200501/content.htm (accessed
November 17, 2009).
Brochmann, Grete. European Integration and Immigration from Third Countries.
Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1996.
Buonfino, Alessandra. “Between Unity and Plurality: The Politicization and
Securitization of the Discourse of Immigration in Europe.” New Political
Science 26, no. 1 (March 2004): 23- 49.
Butt-Philip, Alan. “European Union Immigration Policy: Phantom, Fantasy or
Fact?” West European Politics 17, no.2 (April 1994): 168-191.
Bunyan, Tony. “Trevi, Europol and the European State.” Statewatch, 1993,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/handbook-trevi.pdf (accessed November
30, 2009).
Callovi, Giuseppe. “Part II: Western Europe: New, Old and Recast of
Immigration Questions in the Post-Cold War Period. Regulation of
Immigration in 1993: Pieces of the European Community Jig-Saw
Puzzle.” International Migration Review 26, 2 (Summer 1992): 353-372.
Carrera, Sergio, and Massimo Merlino, eds. “Assessing EU Policy on Irregular
Immigration under the Stockholm Programme.” Centre for European
Policy Studies (October 2010): 1-38, http://shop.ceps.eu/book/assessing-

149

eu-policy-irregular-immigration-under-stockholm-programme (accessed
October 20, 2010).
Caviedes, Alexander. “The Open Method of Co-ordination Immigration Policy: A
Tool for Prying Open Fortress Europe?” Journal of European Public
Policy 11 (April 2004): 289-310.
Cuschieri, Marvin Andrew. “Europe‟s Migration Policy towards the
Mediterranean: The Need of Reconstruction of Policy-Making.” Center
for European Integration Studies, discussion paper (2007),
http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c168Cuschieri.pdf (accessed
November 15, 2009).
Delgado Godoy, Leticia. “Immigration in Europe: Realities and Policies.” Unidad
de PolíticasComparadas [Unity of Comparative Politics], working paper
18 (2002), http://www.iesam.csic.es/doctrab2/dt-0218e.pdf (accessed
November 15, 2009).
Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration.
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.
--------. Europe Recast: A History of European Union. London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2004.
Freeman, Gary P. “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States.”
International Migration Review 29, no. 4 (Winter 1995): 881-902.
Frontex. http://www.frontex.europa.eu (accessed January 18, 2011).
Gebbes, Andrew. “Analysing the Politics of Migration and Immigration in
Europe.” In The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe, edited
by Andrew Gebbes, 1-27. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003.
---------. “The Politics of Migration in an Integrating Europe.” In The Politics of
Migration and Immigration in Europe, edited by Andrew Gebbes, 126148. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003.
---------. “International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating
Europe.” International Migration 39, no. 6 (2001): 21-42.
---------. Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000.
Givens, Terri, and Adam Luedtke. “The Politics of European Union Immigration
Policy: Institutions, Salience, and Harmonization.” Policy Studies Journal
32, no. 1 (February 2004): 145-165.

150

---------. “The Politics of EU Immigration Policy.” Paper prepared for the 8th
EUSA Conference ( Nashville, TN, March 26-29, 2003),
http://aei.pitt.edu/2862 (accessed October 10, 2009).
Guiraudon, Virginie. “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical
Policy-making as Venue Shopping.” Journal of Common Market Studies
38, no, 2 (June 2000): 251-271.
----------. La politique d’immigration en Europe [Politics of Immigration in
Europe]. L‟Harmattan: Paris, 2000.
----------. “The European Union and the New Constitution: A Stable Political
Equilibrium? Theme: Immigration” Website of Andrew Moravcsik, memo
paper from 2004,
www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/conferences/guiraudon.doc
(accessed December 5, 2009).
Herz, Dietmar. “European Immigration and Asylum Policy: Scope and Limits of
Intergovernmental Europeanization.” Paper prepared for the 8th EUSA
Conference (Nashville, TN, March 27-29, 2003), http://aei.pitt.edu/7061/
(accessed April 1, 2009).
Kicinger, Anna, and Katarzyna Saczuk. “Migration Policy in the European
Perspective- Development and the Future Trends.” CEFMR, working
paper 1 (2004): 1-44, http://www.cefmr.pan.pl/docs/cefmr_wp_200401.pdf (accessed November 20, 2009).
Kraft-Kasack, Christiane, and Mariya Shisheva. “The Communitarization of
Asylum and Immigration Policy at Amsterdam: A Liberal
Intergovernmental Account.” Hertie School of Governance, working paper
31 (April 2008): 1-24, www.hertieschool.org/binaries/addon/539_hsog_wp_no._31.pdf (accessed April 10,
2010).
Lavenex, Sandra, and Emek Ucarer. Migration and Externalities of European
integration. Lanham, NY: Lexington Books, 2002.
Lavenex, Sandra, and William Wallance. “Justice and Home Affairs: Towards a
European Public Order?” In Policy-Making in the European Union, edited
by Hellen Wallance, William Wallance, and Mark A. Pollack, 457-480.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Lindstrøm, Channe. “European Union Policy on Asylum and Immigration:
Addressing the Root Causes of Forced Migration: A Justice and Home

151

Affairs Policy of Freedom, Security and Justice?” Social Policy &
Administration 39 (December 2005): 587-605.
Lu, Chien-Yi. “Harmonization of Migration in the European Union: A StateCentric or Institutionalist Explanation?” Paper prepared for the ECSA
Sixth Biennial International Conference (Pittsburgh, PA, June 2-5,
1999), http://aei.pitt.edu/2322/ (accessed November 16, 2009).
Luedtke, Adam. “One Market, 25 Stats, 20 Million Outsiders? European Union
Immigration Policy.” Paper prepared for the 9th Annual Graduate Student
Conference (Georgetown University, Washington DC, February 18-19,
2005), http://aei.pitt.edu/4555/ (accessed December 10, 2009).
Messina, Antony, and Colleen Thouez. “The Logics and Politics of a European
Immigration Regime.” In West European Immigration and Immigrant
Policy in the New Century, edited by Anthony Messina, 97-122. Westport,
CT: Praeger, 2002.
Münz, Rainer. “Europe: Population Change and its Consequences- An
Overview.” Berlin Institute for Population and Development (2007),
http://www.berlin-institut.org/online- handbookdemography/europe.html
(accessed January 20, 2011).
Papademetriou, Demetrios G., Madeline Sumption and Will Somerville.
“Migration and the Economic Downturn: What to Expect in the European
Union.” Migration Policy Institute: Transatlantic Council on Migration
(January 2009),
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/EU_Recession_backgrounde
r.pdf (accessed January 27, 2011).
Reynolds, Paul. “Seville Summit- What Did It Achieve?” BBC News, June 24,
2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2062661.stm (accessed November
25, 2009).
Schain, Martin A. “The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European
Union.” The European Journal of International Law 20, no.1 (2009): 102103.
Shafagatov, Ramin, and Aygun Mirzayeva. “Immigration Policy as a Challenging
Issue in the EU Policy-making Process: A Study of Immigrant Integration
Policy.” MA thesis ( Linkopings University, Sweden: 2005): 1-103,
http://www.temaasyl.se/Documents/Forskning/C%20&%20Duppsatser/Immigration%20Policy%20as%20a%20Challenging%20Issue%
20in%20the%20EU%20Policy-Making%20Process%20A%20Study
%20of%20Immigrant%20Integration%20Policy.pdf (accessed October 20,
2009).

152

“The Lisbon Treaty: 10 Easy-to-read Fact Sheets.” Foundation Robert Schuman,
December, 2009, http://www.robertschuman.eu/doc/divers/lisbonne/en/10fiches.pdf (accessed December 15,
2009).
Vasileva, Katya. “Population and Social Conditions.” Eurostat: Statistics in
Focus 94 (2009),
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-09094/EN/KS-SF-09-094-EN.PDF (accessed January 20, 2011).
Webber, Douglas. “Successful and Genuine Failures: France, Germany and the
others in the History of „Multi-speed‟ European Political Integration.”
European Consortium for Political Research – Riga, conference paper
(2008), http://www.jhubc.it/ecpr-riga/virtualpaperroom/125.pdf (accessed
June 24, 2010).
World Map Maker. www.worldmapmaker.com (accessed January 14, 2011).
The Spanish Immigration Laws and the Regularization Programs
Alscher, Stefan. “Knocking at the Doors of „Fortress Europe‟: Migration and
Border Control in Southern Spain and Eastern Poland. Center for
Comparative Immigration Studies 126 (November 2005), http://www.ccisucsd.org/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg126.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).
Aparicio Gómez, Rosa, and José María Ruiz de Huidobro De Carlos. “Report
from Spain.” In Modes of Migration, Regulation and Control in Europe,
edited by Jeroen Doomernik and Michael Jandl, 147-169. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2008.
Arago, Joaquín. “Becoming a Country of Immigration at the End of the Twentieth
Century: the Case of Spain.” In Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in
Southern Europe, edited by Russell King, Gabriela Lazaridis, and
Charalambos Tsardanidis, 253-276. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,
January 2000.
Baugmather, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in American
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Quoted in KraftKasack, Christiane, and Mariya Shisheva. “The Communitarization of
Asylum and Immigration Policy at Amsterdam: A Liberal
Intergovernmental Account.” Hertie School of Governance working paper
31 (April 2008).

153

Brand, Constant. The Malta Independent Online. October 21, 2006,
http://www.independent.com.mt/news2.asp?artid=40641 (accessed June 2,
2010).
Bruquetas-Callejo, Maria, Blanca Garcés-Mascareñas, Ricard Morén-Alegret,
Rinus Penninx, and Eduardo Ruiz-Vieyte. “Immigration and Integration
Policymaking in Spain.” IMISCOE, working paper 21 (April 2008).
http://www.imiscoe.org/publications/ workingpapers/documents/WP21MigrationpolicymakinginSpain.pdf (accessed June 10, 2009).
Calavita, Kitty. Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
---------. “Immigration, Law and Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes
from Spain.” Law & Society Review 32, no. 3 (1998): 529-566.
Carling, Jørgen. “The Merits and Limitations of Spain's High-Tech Border
Control.” Migration Information Source (June 2007),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=605
(accessed January 18, 2011).
----------. “Unauthorized Migration from Africa to Spain.” International
Migration 45, no. 4 (2007): 3-37.
Closa, Carlos, and Paul M. Heywood. Spain and the European Union. New York:
Palgrave Macmillian, 2004.
Collett, Elizabeth. “The European Union's Stockholm Program: Less Ambition on
Immigration and Asylum, but More Detailed Plans.” Migration Policy
Institute: Migration Information Source (2010),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=768
(accessed February 4, 2011).
Cornelius, Wayne. “Spain: The Uneasy Transition from Labor Exporter to Labor
Importer.” in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, edited by
Wayne Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin and James Hollfield:
386-429. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
Duran Ruiz, Francisco J. “The Relationship between Legal Status, Rights and the
Social Integration of the Immigrants.” The Center for Comparative
Immigration Studies (October 2003),
http://ccis.ucsd.edu/PUBLICATIONS/wrkg84.pdf (accessed March 13,
2009).
Fauser, Margit. “Selective Europeanization: Europe's Impact on Spanish
Migration Control.” In The Europeanization of National Policies and

154

Politics of Immigration, edited by Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette, 136156. Hamprshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Fernández Bessa, Cristina, and José María Ortuño Aix. “Spanish Immigration
Policies and Legislative Evolution in that Field as a New Exceptional
Framework.” Liberty and Security, working paper 9 (May 2006),
http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf/WP9The_reforms_of_the_Immigration_.pdf (accessed February 20, 2009).
Finzi, Fabrizio. “Immigrazione: Aznar-Berlusconi, Insieme per Norme Severe
[Immigration: Aznar-Berlusconi: Together to Strict Rules].” Notizie
ANSA, June 5, 2002. Quoted in Kitty Calavita, Immigrants at the Margins:
Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca. “Migration Policy in Spain.” Migration Citizenship
Education, http://www.migrationeducation.org/48.0.html (accessed on
January 10, 2011).
González, Lydia Esteve, and Richard Mac Bride. “Fortress Europe: Fear of
Immigration? Present and Future of Immigration Law and Policy in
Spain.” UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 6, no. 2
(Spring 2000): 153-192.
González-Enríquez, Carmen. “Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Spain.”
Carl Von Ossietzky University, country report (2005).
http://www.uv.es/CEFD/12/Spain.pdf (accessed July 20, 2009).
González-Enríquez, Carmen, and Alicia Sorroza Blanco. “Working towards a
European Immigration Policy.” Elcano Royal Institute, working paper 57
(2009), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng
/Print?WCM_ GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/elcano/
Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT57-2009 (accessed January 18, 2011).
Gortazar, Cristina. “Spain: Two Immigration Acts at the End of the Millennium.”
European Journal of Migration and Law 4 (2002): 1-21.
Huntoon, Laura. “Immigration to Spain: Implications for a Unified European
Union Immigration Policy.” International Migration Review 32, no. 2
(Summer 1998): 423-450.
Johansson-Nogués, Elisabeth. “A Spanish Model for the European „Near
Abroad‟? The Legacy of Aznar to EU‟s Foreign Policy toward
Neighboring Non-candidate Countries.” Institut Universitari D’Estudis
Europeus: Observatory of European Foreign Policy 8 (2004).

155

http://www.iuee.eu/pdf-publicacio/119/i1QKXulfsYyIVtYSmCtn.PDF
(accessed June 10, 2010).
Kern, Soeren. “Spain‟s Immigration System Runs Amok- Spain‟s Decline.” The
Brussels Journal, September 17, 2008,
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3527/print (accessed March 13,
2009).
Kopanja, Jelena. “Spain Considers Immigration Reform That Would Make
Things Harder for the Undocumented.” Feet in 2 Worlds, July 7 2009.
http://news.feetintwoworlds.orgF/ 2009/07/07/spain-considersimmigration-reform-that-would-make-things-harder-for-theundocumented/ (accessed April 3, 2010).
Lahav, Gallya. Immigration and Politics in the New Europe: Reinventing
Borders. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Levinson, Amanda. “Why Countries Continue to Consider Regularization.”
Migration Policy Institute: Migration Information Source (September 1,
2005), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=330
(accessed June 1, 2010).
Magone, José M. Contemporary Spanish Politics. London: Routledge, 2009.
Maps of Net. http://mapsof.net/ (accessed March 20, 2011).
Mata-Codesal, Diana. “Regularisation Programmes in Spain, the account of a
failure?” Research paper (January, 2007),
http://www.migrationist.com/images/MataCodesal(LegalisationsinSpain).pdf (accessed April 20, 2009).
Migration Data Hub.” Migration Policy Institute: Migration Information Source
(2010), http://www.migrationinformation.org/datahub/charts/6.1.shtml
(accessed January 27, 2011).
Moreno, Francisco Javier. “The Evolution of Immigration Policies in Spain:
Between External Constraints and Domestic Demand for Unskilled
Labour.” Juan March Institute, working paper 2004/211 (December,
2004),
http://www.march.es/ceacs/publicaciones/working/archivos/2004_211.pdf
(accessed September 20, 2009).
Newton, Ryan. “Spanish Immigration Policy since Tampere: Implications of the
Development of a European Immigration Policy.” International Topic
Journal 1, no. 2 (2003): 1-19,

156

http://al.odu.edu/gpis/ITJ/Spanish_Immigartion_Ryan_Newton_Final_8_.
pdf (accessed October 15, 2010).
Pinyol, Gemma. “Europe‟s Southern Border: Spain and the Management of
Immigration.” In Foreign Policy in Dialogue: National Perspectives on
EU Immigration Policy 8, no. 22 (May 2007), edited by Marco
Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch, www.deutscheaussenpolitik.de/newsletter/issue22.pdf (accessed May 25, 2010).
Rooney, Ben. “Spain Suffers 20% Unemployment.” CNN Money, April 30, 2010,
http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/30/news/international/Spain_unemployme
nt/index.htm (accessed July 20, 2010).
Solé, Carlota. “Immigration Policies in Southern Europe.” Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies 30, no. 6 (November 2004): 1209-1221.
Soledad Saux, María. “Immigration and Terrorism: A Constructed Connection:
The Spanish Case.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research
13 (2007): 57-72.
“Spain asks for more resources, clearer rules and specialist offices for
FRONTEX.” Presidencia Española [Spanish Presidency], February 3,
2010,
http://www.eu2010.es/en/documentosynoticias/noticias/feb3_rubalcaba_fr
ontex.html (accessed January 10, 2011).
“Spain‟s New Law on Foreigners Comes into Effect.” Talk Radio Europe,
December 13, 2009,
http://www.talkradioeurope.com/news/publish/article_24315.shtml
(accessed June 20, 2010).
Tedesco, Laura. “Immigration and Foreign Policy: The Economic Crisis and Its
Challenges.” FRIDE: A European Think Tank for Global Action no. 25
(January 2010): 1-5,
www.fride.org/download/PB_Spain_Immigration_ENG_jan10.pdf
(accessed July 20, 2010).
The University of Texas Libraries. “Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection:
Europe Maps.” The University of Texas at Austin.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/spain.jpg (accessed January 14,
2011).
Watts, Julie. “Italian and Spanish Labor Leaders‟ Unconventional Immigration
Policy Preferences.”South European Society and Politics (Spring 1999):
129-148.

157

Worden, Tom. “Spain Sees Sixfold Increase in Immigrants Over Decade.”
Guardian, February 8, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/08/spain-sixfold-increaseimmigrants (accessed June 4, 2010).
Zapata-Barrero, Ricard. “Spanish Challenges and European Dilemma: Socialising
the Debate on the Integration of Immigrants.” Perspectives on European
Politics and Society 4, no. 2 (2003), http://dcpis.upf.edu/~ricardzapata/Article%20PEPS.pdf (accessed June 2, 2010).
Zapata-Barrero, Ricard, and Nynke De Witte. “The Spanish Governance of EU
Borders: Normative Questions.” Mediterranean Politics 12, no. 1 (March
2007): 85-90.

158

